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ANY friend of the administration who fails at the present time to speak frankly about the effect produced by the breakdown in the management of the war upon the state of mind of the public is doing to President Wilson a most indifferent service. The completeness of that breakdown at this time, its paralyzing results on American war efficiency and the drastic measures which may be needed to provide a remedy, are bringing into existence a steadily increasing measure of public impatience and anxiety. If the discomforts and the losses caused by the failure of the fuel supply stood alone, if they were not symptomatic of a semi-paralysis of the general industrial mechanism of the country and prophetic of future failures, no less serious in their results, in other equally essential war services, they would be suffered with equanimity. The prevailing anxiety and impatience is born of the foreboding that the country is helplessly drifting into a succession of similar crises, which if they are allowed to develop will continue to paralyze American ability to assist our Allies and do harm to Germany, and which will react balefully on the morale of the nation. Notwithstanding all the devoted and disinterested work of the administrative chiefs and their assistants, notwithstanding the considerable progress, based upon wise political decisions, which has been made in organizing many war services, the fundamental difficulties in organizing these services have not yet been overcome. The government is still without any general plan which can be credited with a decent chance of concentrating in Europe at the earliest possible moment a fair maximum of American military and economic power. No adequate arrangements have yet been made to transfer from non-essential to essential industries an abundant supply of willing labor, to ensure the fullest production and the unhampered domestic movement of commodities needed by both the military and civil population, to grow, distribute and save as much food as will be required by America and its European Allies, and to build in a short enough time the number of ships which will enable American soldiers and supplies to move freely to Europe. It is the knowledge of this condition which is furnishing the military party in Germany with their strongest argument for prolonging the war by insisting on impossible terms.

DEEP as is the popular anxiety and discontent about the conduct of the war, it could be relieved quickly by the adoption of a different attitude on the part of the administration—by a more evident intention on its part to achieve a greater energy of preparation by means of the exercise of more foresight. Hitherto the delays have been caused chiefly by a reluctance to plan ahead, and by a settled determination to use old officials and old methods until their inadequacy was clearly demonstrated in practice. Whatever may have been the justification in the beginning for the adoption of this attitude towards the problems of war management, they have manifestly no application now. The nation is tired of losing time and energy by drifting into crises, and then losing more time and energy in extricating some essential public service from the resulting confusion and paralysis. It does

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not want to be used as a laboratory for any further demonstration of the inadequacy to the problem of war organization of the old methods of conducting public business. It is already convinced. It wants to have future crises anticipated and forestalled, and if crises cannot be forestalled without the adoption of drastic measures, which will impose severe personal sacrifices on themselves, they will loyally and cheerfully accept the President's assurance of the necessity of such sacrifices. What it will not stand is the pretense that the war is being successfully conducted when they know it is not being successfully conducted. What they will not stand is the sense that they are being made to pay for failures to get results for which there is no sufficient excuse. What they are craving is a frank and clear admission of the seriousness of the crisis on the part of the chiefs of the administration, and some evidence of the adoption for the future of a more energetic, foresighted and thoroughgoing plan of handling the problems of war management.

ON Sunday the New York World printed an important interview with Colonel W. B. Thompson, who has lately returned to the United States after a stay of six months in Russia. He believes Kerensky might in time have waged successful war against Germany if the Cadets, "this highly respected group of privileged persons," had not lied about him, done everything they could to destroy his influence, and betrayed him. Among Russians it is the Cadets who are chiefly responsible for turning the government over to the Bolsheviki. But the Bolsheviki themselves, says Colonel Thompson, "are not and never have been pro-German, and the attitude of the American press in failing to understand them has tended to aid the Kaiser's cause." They have "maintained a most surprising degree of order in Russia." In Petrograd, "during the first month of the November revolution, I can say from my personal observation there was better order than at any other time during my four months' stay." Russia, he believes, "is pointing the way to a general peace, just as she is pointing the way to great and sweeping world changes." Colonel Thompson, a good American with a good pair of eyes, is peculiarly fitted to knock some sense into the heads of our own reactionaries, who will heed him more because they know he is a rich man and a banker.

EXTREMELY disappointing and disquieting is the Shipping Board's most recent statement, issued this week by Mr. Hurley. He says the Director of Operations, Mr. Carry, "will have in New York a Controller of Shipping, who will be on the ground to coöperate with the War Port Board and the War Department, giving quick decisions and seeing to it that no ship remains idle except in case of necessity." This Shipping Controller is to work "under Mr. Carry" and to execute plans "worked out by Director Carry." Such changes as these fall miserably short of meeting the immediate necessities of the situation. What is needed, and needed at once, is a Controller of Shipping who shall have as complete authority in his field as Mr. Hoover has in his. We shall fail to make the best use of the inadequate tonnage at our disposal unless the powers now divided between the Shipping Board and the Quartermaster General's department are united and given to one man, who ought to be a man trained in the difficult business of loading and moving ships, and competent to decide what they shall be loaded with and where they shall go. Such a Controller of Shipping as Mr. Hurley describes, who will be under the orders of a Director of Operations with no previous experience in the shipping business, and who will have no control whatever of the army ships, will not be a Controller of Shipping except in name.

PROTECTIONISTS seem to be needlessly alarmed by the reference in the President's address to the removal of economic barriers. World free trade is an ideal no well informed free trader expects to see established by the treaty of peace or by any subsequent negotiations among friendly nations. Then what is implied by the removal of economic barriers? For one thing, differential duties against particular foreign nations might be covered by the phrase. A general duty levied by Germany on imported wheat is not a serious barrier to our exportation of wheat. The German consumer will be forced to pay prices high enough to draw our wheat over his own customs barrier. A heavy duty on our wheat, accompanied by a low duty on Russian wheat, would effectually exclude our exporters from the German market. For another thing the phrase may apply to monopolistic colonial policies. It would not be by a legitimate extension of the principle of protection that we could justify ourselves in excluding all foreign trade from the Philippines. That the President had in mind these two classes of economic barriers would appear to be clear from the circumstances in which he made his pronouncement. He was seeking to convince Germany that her economic future was not dependent upon victory in the present war. Now the policies of tariff discrimination and colonial monopoly are precisely the dangers liberal Germans most fear. If these dangers were removed, an important element in the community of interest between the military adventurer and the peaceful trader would disappear.

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RAILWAY operation by the government, as we pointed out in our last issue, may remain just as necessary in the period of reconstruction as it is for the period of the war. The presidents and owners of railways who are pressing for a time limit upon government operation, not to exceed one year after the close of the war, probably recognize that it would be better, theoretically, for the government to keep its hands on the railways until the problems of reconstruction had been disposed of, and until some practicable scheme of unification under private control had been worked out. But they fear that the movement for public ownership will receive a great impetus if government operation continues for a sufficient period to produce valuable results. This may be true or it may not be true; neither the railway presidents nor any one else can predict with certainty what effect on public opinion the government's experiment in railway operation will have. It seems a safe guess, however, that if the public is forced to suffer grave inconvenience because the railways are returned too soon after the war, just as it is now suffering grave inconvenience because they were taken over too late, the case for public ownership will seem to the average voter pretty conclusive.

STOCK dividends are not income, according to a recent decision of the Supreme Court. "A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of a corporation, and adds nothing to the interest of the shareholders. The only change is in the evidence which represents that interest." It follows logically that stock dividends are not taxable under the law-taxing income as such; whether they are taxable under the law now in force, which specifically applies to stock dividends as well as to income more narrowly defined, remains to be determined. We may hope that when this question comes before the Court for decision, full consideration will be given to the economic facts in the case. When an investor receives a stock dividend, does he in economic fact receive merely a change in the evidence of his interest? This is true when capital is openly and shamelessly watered. The investor receives, say, two shares instead of one, but the value of the two is not superior to that of the one. When, on the other hand, a soundly financed corporation declares a stock dividend, the original shares do not sink in value, or, if they sink, not in the measure of the new value created. The effect upon the interest of the investor is identical with the effect of the declaration of an extra cash dividend out of accumulated surplus. If such extra cash dividends are taxable, stock dividends ough to be taxable as well.

BOLSHEVIK policy in repudiating the Russian national debt is shortsighted in the extreme. On grounds of expedience there is no defense for it. But the Bolsheviki defend their procedure on grounds of political morality. The old debt, they say, was raised not for the benefit of the Russian people but to provide means for repression. The assertion is not to be dismissed without consideration. Let us recall the circumstances of the loan of one hundred million sterling, floated in London and Paris in 1906 while the fate of the first Duma hung in the balance. The Czar was at the point of bankruptcy: money was absolutely required to pay the Cossacks and assure their loyalty. If the Duma could have said, Without our consent, no money, it would have been able to lay the basis for a sound constitution. The liberals of Russia earnestly entreated London and Paris to hold up the loan, just for a few months, at most, until the necessary constitutional concessions could be wrested from the Czar. London and Paris knew exactly what was at stake. Neither British nor French are likely ever to ignore the relations between control of the purse and representative government. But London and Paris rejected the plea of the Russian liberals and provided the Czar with the money he required. Thus ended the first and most promising movement for the reconstitution of Russia as a liberal state, able to maintain prosperity at home and honor abroad. We might have had a Russia that would stand by us to the end if London and Paris had not been so complaisant to the autocracy that was destined to betray us.

IF there is any policy on which an intelligent anti-suffragist ought to be insistent, it is the protection of women—the protection of women in the home when they are in the home, and the protection of women in industry when they are forced to seek employment. Yet because the War Department has limited the hours and prevented night work of women uniform makers, Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York has objected. Beside all the failures to take vigorous action in the army headquarters, the order enforcing civilized standards for women in industry stands out as a praiseworthy exception. Anyone in the least familiar with the conditions of efficient production as demonstrated in all belligerent countries, to say nothing of the conditions of social health, must know that such measures are necessary. Senator Wadsworth's selection of this particular policy to question is a really startling exhibition of rare political stupidity. He could not have devised a better way of supporting the suffragists' contention that women's votes are necessary to safeguard women.

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Democratic Diplomacy

The New Republic, May 17, 1917: "Considering the overwhelming importance of Russian coöperation in carrying on the war, American public opinion has of late been extraordinarily indifferent and blind to conditions in Russia and to the bearing of those conditions upon the responsibilities and policy of the United States. . . . The Russians are ardent internationalists who really want a general peace and are willing to make sacrifices to obtain it. If their craving for a general peace is attributed chiefly to pro-German intrigue, if it is misunderstood and flouted by the diplomacy of the Allies, they are likely to make a move in that direction themselves or consent to an overture from Germany."

The New Republic, June 2, 1917: "The entrance of the United States into the war on the basis of the President's Senate address has made possible a new orientation of the Allied encirclement. We must now face the Central Powers with a sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other."

The New Republic, June 16, 1917: "Mr. Wilson's note betrayed a curious lack of imagination about the complexities, the infirmities and the dominant motives of the ruling opinion in Petrograd. He accuses the Russian Socialists of allowing themselves to be used for their own undoing by the Imperial Russian government, while at the same time he never expressed by a single word his appreciation of the invaluable contribution which the Russian democrats have made to the future pacification of Central Europe by virtue of their renunciation of a policy of conquest."

The New Republic, July 28, 1917: "The Allies, like the Germans, must treat the Russian revolution as the key to the situation. . . . Allied diplomacy during the past few months has done nothing to secure the new Russia from the malevolent vigor of German intrigue and military assault, and the Revolution is now fighting for its life with its back to the wall against an appalling array of internal and external enemies. Yet if the Russian Republic should go to pieces or if the Russian Revolution should survive only by means of a military dictatorship, the one great gain of the war would be imperiled or lost."

The New Republic, September 22, 1917: "The statesmen who made so many concessions to Russian imperialism should be willing to make the concession of tolerance and patience to the Russian democracy. . . . The Russian Republic may still survive, provided it is loyally supported in France and England. But if it is misunderstood, scolded, suspected and thwarted by its fellow democracies, it can hardly fail to become the victim of the extremists in Russia, who are waiting to take advantage of foreign hostility."

"NOTHING is simple in war time," said Mr. John Dewey recently, "save emotion." Certainly nothing is more complicated, not to say contradictory, in war time than the articulate expression of simple emotions. The finality combined with the innocence of these contradictory expressions of simple emotions is one of the most baffling aspects of war psychology. Take, for instance, the reception given to the recent addresses on war aims of Messrs. Lloyd George and Wilson by the American newspapers. They have greeted the two speeches with warm and general approval. Yet the great majority of them, whether liberal or reactionary in their ordinary tendency, have consistently stigmatized the advocates of a redefinition of war aims as enemies within the gates. Although they have insisted for months that the only aim was military victory, although they have condemned the proposed policy of seeking victory both by political and military weapons as little short of treason to the Allied cause, they greet a manifest attempt by President Wilson to use democratic diplomacy in order to win the war with almost hysterical enthusiasm.

The President's last address to Congress differs from the last speech of Lloyd George and from any previous definition of war aims chiefly in its frank reliance on daylight democratic diplomacy and its cordial recognition of the assistance which the peace overtures of the Bolsheviki have rendered to the cause of the Allies. As the British labor leaders say: "In our judgment these two declarations of President Wilson in favor of open diplomacy and in support of revolutionary Russia will make the Congress speech one of the classic utterances of Allied statesmanship during the war." Do the American newspapers agree with President Wilson in his emphasis upon democratic diplomacy and the need of working with Russia or not? If they do not agree with him let them frankly express their dissent and visit upon him some of the condemnation which they have lavished during the past few months on the advocates of this policy. If they do agree with him, how can they reconcile this agreement with their earlier attitude towards the policy which they have come to support? As Mr. Brailsford so clearly establishes elsewhere in this issue, the essential concession for which the Russians were asking all summer and fall was the revised statement of war aims, which now that it is published creates such general and unqualified enthusiasm. Again and again the Russians were promised an inter-Allied conference devoted to the discussion and formulation of a common political program, and again and again the promise was broken. When the conference finally assembled the discussion of political aims was forbidden, and it was this indifference to the need of political unity and this rejection of public diplomacy which resulted in the triumph of the Bolsheviki in Russia. The policy of avoiding daylight diplomacy, as if it brought with it some kind of moral contamination, and of throwing the Russians contemptuously into the discard as a parcel of cowardly traitors, was as enthusiastically supported by the great majority of the American press as they are now supporting President Wilson's salutary attempt to reverse it.

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The newspapers condemned daylight diplomacy, the public definition and discussion of war aims and a sympathetic and understanding attitude towards Russian internationalism, because their editors were thinking only of military victory and considered the use of political weapons as incompatible with it. The public definition and discussion of war aims would, they feared, tend to impair the ability and resolution of the Allied nations to fight. As the event has proved, its effect would have been precisely the opposite. Had statesmen in the Allied countries opened their minds to the value of democratic diplomacy in a war waged to safeguard democracy soon after the Russians first called their attention to it, they would have prolonged the life of the Russian army as a containing, if not an aggressive force, and they would probably have prevented the diversion of troops and the political discontent which caused the Italian disaster. But they persisted in the exclusive use of the military weapon until their obstinacy had undermined the military strength of the Allies, and until an extreme Maximalist government had come into power in Russia. Then and then only did they call to their assistance a political counter offensive. They have encouraged Bolshevikism first by refusing to make any concessions to the pleading of the Russian moderates, and secondly by yielding to the Maximalists what they had refused to the Minimalists. They have fallen back during a period of military adversity upon a use of political weapons, which if it had been courageously employed during a period of comparative military prosperity would have already brought them much nearer the goal of victory. Even so, the result of the use of the political weapon has justified the hopes of its friends rather than the fears of its enemies. In the last few weeks a genuine revival has taken place in the fighting morale of the nations allied against Germany and a substantial improvement in their prospects of winning the war.

We are not calling attention to the injury to the cause of the Allies which the American newspapers have wrought by the support of the foregoing policy merely for purposes of recrimination. Their former attitude and its contradiction with their warm approval of the President's speech deserves discussion chiefly because the same error is likely to be repeated. Public opinion in America as represented by the press still fails to understand the transformation which the war policy of the Grand Alliance has just undergone. The newspapers usually interpret the President's statement of terms as a rigid ultimatum, which from now on is to be forced on the Central Powers at the point of the sword. While they can no longer declare military victory to be the only war aim, they evidently consider military victory to be the only route by which the new war aims of the Allies can be attained. This view is true, in so far as it insists on the persistent use of the sword as an instrument of victory. It is not true in so far as it depends upon the sword as the only weapon. President Wilson in proclaiming his belief in daylight diplomacy was not only laying down one condition of an enduring peace; he was recommending a method of attaining the objects of the present war which would and must be pursued until the end. He was himself exemplifying the practice which he considers necessary for the success of future international negotiations and transactions. He was not defying the Central Powers with an irrevocable and iron-clad ultimatum. He was beginning a negotiation or rather he was carrying on a negotiation which had already been begun. The comparative importance of the different parts in this negotiation, to be played hereafter by armed force and democratic diplomacy, will depend upon the effect of the President's propaganda upon public opinion in Russia, in Central Europe, in France and Great Britain and in this country. But this much is certain. The war program is not a body of absolute right which Germany must be forced to accept at any sacrifice. It is a statement of principles which are capable of several alternative applications. It is also an instrument of negotiation, which will subsequently be modified in so far as its modification may help to maintain union among the Allies, to promote dissension among the enemy and to improve the prospects of obtaining a just and enduring peace. In this sense the English labor leaders are justified in declaring that negotiations for peace have been begun. Public negotiations not only are compatible with a vigorous prosecution of the war but depend in part for their success upon the energy of the Allied military policy and the scope of their military preparations.

The President cannot carry on these negotiations without loyal and intelligent assistance from the press and from public opinion. If the newspapers continue to call Russia "a Judas among nations" and continue to treat the Bolsheviki as if they were little better than moral vermin, the President will not succeed very well in his attempt to protect the Russian revolution against Germany and to recover for the Allies the confidence of the Russian people. If they continue to use the word "Hun" as an epithet covering the whole German nation and do their utmost to arouse feelings of vindictive hatred against all men and all things German, he will fail in his attempt to drive in a wedge between the German people and their government. Democratic diplomacy must not only be

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transacted in public, but it cannot be successful without the participation of the public; and in encouraging and guiding public participation the coöperation of the newspapers is indispensable. They can lead American opinion along, so that the words of the American press will become the voice of the American people, echoing the faith of their President and expressing their confidence in the democratic impulse whether in Russia or in Germany. If they will offer this kind and measure of support to the President's democratic diplomacy, it would not only increase enormously the effect of his propaganda, but it would rally to an ardent support of the war many American farmers and workingmen who have been alienated by the lack of democratic principle among those who claimed to be the most ardent advocates of a democratic war.

The Bolsheviki and the Junkers

THE Russian peace parleys may or may not continue, but we should beware of taking them at their face value. They do not mean what they appear to mean. Both parties to the conversation are manoeuvring for position rather than negotiating for peace. Trotzky is unwilling to break off the conference, because the Bolsheviki were placed in power for the purpose of pursuing an active peace policy. Yet he must realize how impossible it would be for an extreme revolutionary government to conclude a final treaty of peace with the most reactionary and militarist government in the world. He must realize how fatally his success in negotiating the peace, for which his fellow-countrymen are longing, with the German autocracy would undermine the moral standing and the political power of the faction which was responsible for the humiliating bargain. His game is to keep the hope of peace alive by continuing the parleys but to avoid the disaster which would overtake his party and his personal influence in case he purchased peace at the price current. Neither are these tactics as futile as they look on first appearance. Trotzky is essentially a revolutionary agitator. His ability to agitate effectively depends upon neither giving up his negotiations nor allowing them to reach a successful conclusion. In much the same way von Kuehlmann is looking for indirect rather than direct gains from prolonging the conversation. His first plan of using the negotiations with Russia in order to obtain a peace with the western Allies at the expense of Russia has failed. But although he fully understands the impossibility of concluding either a separate or a general peace on any basis which is at present being discussed, he is expecting during the period of negotiation to tighten the bonds of German intrigue and influence on Russia, and when the spring comes to obtain for his country many of the economic and military benefits of a separate peace.

People who are still capable of evoking some satisfaction, no matter how grim, from the ironical aspect of human affairs were fascinated by the spectacle of peace parleys between the Junkers and the Bolsheviki. The negotiations are being carried on between spokesmen of two social and political orders whose hostility one to another is theoretically absolute. The Revolution is represented by an obscure journalist who a few months ago was living from hand to mouth in New York. He is devoid of any equipment of experience and training which would apparently enable him to hold his own against two such adroit political traders as Czernin and von Kuehlmann. He is ignorant of diplomatic forms, contemptuous of diplomatic methods and deprived of all ordinary diplomatic resources. He is speaking for a government which cannot govern, an army which will not fight, a nation which is drifting into anarchy, a people who for the time being are not capable of acting together. He is fighting, consequently, with none of the weapons which are usually considered essential for diplomatic success. He is armed only with the spear of publicity. He is sustained only by the ultimate invulnerability of the vast innocent mass of the Russian people. The revolutionary impulse which he is trying to propagate has no method except agitation and political sabotage. Yet if the Bolsheviki depend too much on the weapon of violence and allow themselves to be possessed by its spirit and method, they themselves, like the French Jacobins, will be hanged by the rope which they prepared for their enemies. Trotzky is fascinating because he represents a Revolution which may be successful even though it is incompetent and almost powerless.

Established order as represented by Czernin and von Kuehlmann possesses all the weapons, equipment and advantages which the Revolution lacks. The Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns are among the oldest reigning families in Europe and are stuffed with pride over their lineage, their historic career and their success in surviving into the modern world as dynasties. Their representatives are trained diplomats, methodical and precise to a fault, and furnished with all the tools which under ordinary conditions would guarantee success in international negotiations. Their subjects are still obedient. Their armies are intact and are capable of fighting persistently. They could take anything in Russia, which they considered worth the trouble. The Russians can never drive them out of the vast stretches of Russian territory which

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they now occupy. All diplomatic precedents run in their favor. The idea of negotiating seriously with a revolutionary parvenu like Trotzky is as absurd and obnoxious to them as the idea of consulting a soap-box orator about German and Imperial policy. Yet they are forced to go through the forms of negotiation, and while they will probably secure an advantage in this verbal traffic, their ultimate victory is by no means certain. Trotzky represents the extreme of revolutionary fanaticism which organized militarism is bound ultimately to provoke. May not the duel which is now taking place at Brest-Litovsk between Junkerism and Bolshevikism under the guise of these peace parleys contribute to the undoing of both? May not each of them do something to render his adversary less dangerous, not to himself but to the world? Both Trotzky and von Kuehlmann may well beware. He who sups with the devil must fish with a long spoon.

In the meantime, Americans should not be tempted by the renewal of the negotiations to impute failure to the President's policy of seeking Russian coöperation. Mr. Wilson did not expect by his recent speech to bring about an immediate change in the Russian attitude. He did not expect to conciliate the Bolsheviki, who are as anxious to destroy other capitalist governments as they are to destroy that of Germany. Neither did he expect to succeed quickly in undermining their power. What he is hoping to do is to restore confidence in the western Allies among the more moderate Russian revolutionists, and so to lay the foundation of a pro-Ally party in Russia which will eventually recover power. But the recovery must needs consume several months. Peace negotiations will have to be continued by any Russian government which expects to survive because the Russian people demand an active effort to bring the war to an end; and, from the point of view of the western Allies, such negotiations may be very useful in undermining German morale, provided only they are not permitted to lead to a successful conclusion. The Bolsheviki can consequently be profitably employed as the brokers in an unsuccessful parley in the hope that they may remove the obstacles to an ultimately successful negotiation, to be undertaken by a pro-Ally Russian party. No doubt the policy involves a real danger. Von Kuehlmann may twist Trotzky around his finger and gain for Germany concessions from Russia which will help the German government to pull through another campaign. But after the errors of the Allies in dealing with Russia there is no alternative course. The Bolshevik government should neither be officially recognized nor as in the past studiously ignored. It should be tolerated, and its assault upon the moral endurance of the German people should be reinforced. At the same time every possible assistance should be given to the Russian nation in its attempt to reorganize, and as one condition of reorganization is the creation of a stable political authority, recognition should be granted to the new constituent assembly just as soon as it gives any indication of the ability and the will to govern. Then the Russian revolution will be strengthened to resist German intrigue and to join with the democracies of the west in taking the final steps to secure satisfactory peace.

Just as it will require time to restore the morale of Russia, so it will require time to undermine the morale of Germany. The success of the President's counter offensive cannot be measured by its immediate effects. Of course the official German papers would be violent in their retorts and the liberal papers lukewarm, but the ground has been prepared for increasingly bitter dissensions within Germany and between Germany and Austria. The Germans are still being deluded by the mirage of ultimate victory, and the delusion derives additional plausibility because of the backwardness of military and economic preparations to assist its Allies which are being made by the American government. But as soon as the illusion of victory can again be taken away from the people of Central Europe, the disintegrating acids will begin to work. Both the military party and its liberal opponents have been chagrined by the terms recently offered at Brest-Litovsk and by their reception. The pan-Germans consider their country cheated of victory, and the Socialists consider themselves betrayed. Any further peace initiative by the Teutonic Allies will be designed to allay the opposition of either one of these parties. Less than ever can it satisfy them both. If the government seeks to please the liberals, in spite of the opposition of the General Staff and the military party, it will have to declare war on the pan-Germans and rest unequivocally on the liberal support. If it tries to please the pan-Germans it will meet with an increasingly dangerous popular agitation and opposition. The first alternative might easily result in a coup d'état by the military party. The second might result in the spread of revolutionary sabotage. Thus the German government is hesitating on the brink either of really capitulating to its liberals and of getting rid of the worst obstacle to peace negotiations or of encouraging the kind of violence which would weaken its power of military resistance. It cannot for long hold the balance between the two parties, and a tilt either one way or the other will unloose political passions and forces which may make of Germany either a nation which is no longer united for war, or a nation which it is no longer necessary to fight.

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After the War—Reaction or Reconstruction

THE national government has recently assumed control of the railroads as an apparently indispensable condition of operating them with the utmost efficiency. It is threatening to assume control of the coal mines. The nationalization of the railroads has been preceded by a nationalization of ocean shipping and of the distribution of food, by a comprehensive system of price fixing for many if not all basic commodities, by an official attempt to recognize organized labor and to secure its loyal coöperation, by reiterated appeals to the American people to cut down wasteful expenditures and to invest the resulting savings in Liberty Bonds, and finally by a schedule of taxation for large incomes and excess profits, which a few years ago would have been considered sheer confiscation. The government has adopted these drastic measures under the stern compulsion of war. It has met with little opposition because no other methods of escaping a disastrous economic breakdown have been seriously suggested, and because all of these innovations apply only for the duration of the war. When the war is over, so it is expressly understood, the questions as to how far any one or any part of these revolutionary changes shall be permanently retained will be reconsidered. A new decision will then be reached on the merits of each question without prejudice in favor either of the old economy or the new.

It is, of course, eminently fair that these grave questions of national economic policy should come up for reconsideration at the end of the war. People who either from interest or conviction are opposed to interference by the government with what has been called their own private affairs have consented to receive the government as a temporary occupant of their house of business, whereas they would have uncompromisingly opposed any policy of giving to the intruder a permanent billet. They are entitled to another hearing as soon as the war is over, and they will undoubtedly get it in full measure. In fact they will probably get it in more than full measure. These stupendous increases in the functions of the national government are threatening to the interests and even to the survival of many powerful classes in the community. They involve a radical change in the balance of economic power, an increase of administrative as compared to legislative power which Congress will fear, and an increase of central as compared with local power which the states will dislike. All these opposing interests will regard this vast extension of national authority which is associated with the autocratic but necessary war power of the executive as ephemeral as the war power itself. Indeed what many of the most convinced opponents of government intrusion into private business mean by a reconsideration of these questions at the end of the war is in substance an automatic and inevitable return to the status quo ante. They regard the former industrial conditions as essentially normal and permanent, and the recent intrusion of the government as a catastrophe precipitated by the violent irrelevance of war.

Those who look with favor on the increasing nationalization of the business and labor organization of the country have no right to demand that innovations accepted under compulsion during the war be retained without further question as permanent, but they are entitled to demand that automatic restoration of the status quo ante should not be promised or expected. What will be needed at the end of the war is a genuine reconsideration of these questions, which should allow sufficient time for their exhaustive and prolonged public discussion, and which, if possible, should culminate in a presidential election. It would be blind obscurantism to treat the nationalization of the railroads and the coal and food supplies of the country as the ephemeral and episodic consequence of a military emergency, and to ignore the question as to how far the breakdown of private management during the war emergency was not the natural fruits of defects which had been sufficiently conspicuous under more normal conditions. It would be no less obscurantist to surrender helplessly at the end of the war the public benefits which may have accrued from the incorporation of these essential sources into the national organization. These economic innovations should be watched as a deeply significant experiment which, although rendered practicable by the accident of the war, is far from being a violent and irrelevant episode in American economic development. Their final adoption had been emphatically foreshadowed by the economic agitation and fermentation of recent years. Those who shared in that agitation have been vindicated by the policy which the government has been obliged to pursue under the pressure of a manifest public necessity.

Every one of these emergency measures was adopted to meet evils in the old system to which its radical critics had long called attention in vain and which the war had rendered intolerable. They had insisted on the waste and the inefficiency of operating the railroads of the country as competing lines of varying degrees of economic strength and on the impossibility of devising a schedule of rates which would be sufficiently remunerative to the weaker roads without at the same

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time being excessively remunerative to the stronger. They have pointed out the way in which the private ownership and operation of the coal mines results in the waste either to the producer of excessively low prices or to the consumer of excessively high prices. They have urged that the former system of producing and distributing the nation's food succeeded in keeping down the profit margin of the producer and in rendering his economic position insecure, while at the same time resulting frequently in extortionate charges to the consumer. They have protested against the expenditure on luxuries which is born of profiteering economy as an inexcusable waste of the capital, the raw materials and the labor of the world. They have advocated the policy of diminishing this expenditure on luxuries and of equalizing the distribution of wealth by super taxes on large incomes and excess profits. Above all they have denounced the essential inhumanity of an economic and legal system which surrounded the class interests of property owners with every possible protection, but which left the wage-earners as a class to shift for themselves. They have insisted on the necessity of incorporating trades unions into the official working organization of the nation.

Their criticisms have been validated at least in part by the experience of the war. That event placed a terrific strain not merely on the machinery of national administration but on every aspect and function of the economic and social organism. The nation had been trusting many extremely important public economic interests to property owners and capitalists who were licensed to serve these interests as an incidental result of earning profits for themselves. The arrangement worked, but did not work well. It was much more satisfactory to the profiteers than to the public. Then suddenly as a result of the war the need of bringing about a more complete satisfaction of these public interests waxed acute and implacable. If the old assumption of a pre-established harmony between the fulfilment of public and private interests had been correct, the way to key up the system to a higher level of public efficiency would have been to do away with former interferences with the freedom of private business and to call on it for an uninterrupted supply of the commodities and service demanded by the efficient prosecution of the war. Yet if such a course had been adopted, what with soaring prices, strikes, and popular discontent, the machinery of economic production would by this time have been brought almost to a standstill, and the nation would have been unable to supply either its own needs or those of its allies. The old economy when tested under a strain was shown up as less than fifty per cent efficient, neither could it be made as increasingly efficient as the emergency demanded without abandoning the old reliance on private interest. All along the line measures were adopted which depended for success on the substitution for profit-making as the motive of industry, the motive of seeking to do a good job, of devotion to a patriotic cause or of contributing to the welfare of one's fellow countrymen.

Radicals have consequently a sufficient excuse for considering the compulsory nationalizing of the economic organization under the emergency of war as an illuminating experiment. It indicates the road which the American people will have to travel, in case they wish their economic and social system to serve public rather than private interests. During a national crisis they have been compelled to cut out some of the waste and some of the inhumanity of an economy dominated by private individual interests. When the crisis is over the bold experiment, it has been already admitted, will have to be reconsidered; but if the innovations are to have a fair chance of being reconsidered on their merits, the reconsideration should be made in the light of all the facts. Before any decision is taken a full investigation should be made as to the causes of the breakdown, as to the advantages or disadvantages of the emergency experiments and as to the most promising method of doing away with the disadvantages and keeping the advantages. The problem should be approached not with the purpose of recovering economic assets which had been pawned during a period of dearth, but with the purpose of meeting defects in our economic organization which were recognized previous to the war and retaining improvements which have resulted from the war emergency. It will be a problem not of conservation but of reconstruction.

Perhaps some of our readers will accuse us of prejudging the issue under the pretense of insisting on its fair and full reconsideration. Well, in one sense we are prejudging it. It would, as we think, be a great mistake for the American nation to abandon any of the economic and social experiments which have been forced on it by the exigencies of the war. But if this judgment is correct, its correctness would not depend upon any belief that the vast extension of centralized national authority would itself provide an adequate solution of the problem of providing cheap and satisfactory food, fuel, transportation for the American consumers, and fair living conditions for American workers and productive agencies. The recently adopted measures of state socialism will bring with them new difficulties no less formidable than the old and new dangers no less threatening to the future of democracy and the welfare of the American people. These difficulties cannot be overcome and the

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dangers averted unless equally effective measures are taken to build up within the state independent centers of economic and social allegiance which will be capable of balancing and, if necessary, of resisting the political leviathan. Nevertheless, the new national economy has one clear and decisive advantage over the old, which entitles it to a full trial. It clears up in part the confusion between public and private interests which has been responsible for so many of the abuses and failures of the economic system. Society will no longer be trusting the welfare of its workers, and its official provisions for essential economic services, to the interests of those individuals who supply the capital necessary to carry on the services and engage in the work. These services and this work will be stamped conspicuously and indelibly as public. They will not as in the past be merely affected by public interest; they will be dominated and possessed by a public interest. This is the great and fruitful innovation which has been accomplished since the United States entered the war, and it is an innovation whose abandonment after the war would be manifestly and damnably reactionary.

Agrarian Reorganization

WHATEVER other blessings peace may bring, it will not bring instant relief to the masses who are now distressed by food shortage and its natural consequence, high prices. There will be as many mouths to feed when the armies are demobilized as there are now. It is true that the fare of the soldiers in most European countries is more liberal than that of the civil population, but no statesman will take comfort in the prospect of masses of disbanded soldiers reduced to the level of civil undernourishment. And besides, the civil populations that are now enduring semi-starvation uncomplainingly, recognizing that no relief can be expected while the energies of their government are engrossed by war, will be far less patient when peace returns. More food, not less, will be required in peace.

Well, we shall be able to produce more, say the optimists. The soldiers of today will be the food producers of the time of peace. They will vastly increase the harvests of the first season after the war. This, clearly, is what is required. But it is a dangerous optimism that expects it to be realized automatically. Between one-third and one-half of the soldiers now under arms are of non-agricultural antecedents, and will not be immediately qualified for agriculture, which tends steadily to become more and more a skilled trade, requiring special training and aptitude. Of those who left the country for military service, a large proportion will return weaned from the habits that made them contented before. They can be induced to return to the fields only if they conceive that their prospects of comfort have been improved. It is true that great numbers of the veterans of our own Civil War returned promptly to agriculture. But they were not compelled to go back to underpaid drudgery as farm hands in the settled districts, or to stony farm lots on the bleak hills of the Atlantic seaboard. The government could offer a quarter section of rich land in the Mississippi Valley to every veteran who chose to accept it as a gift. The Civil War, like every other war, broke down established habits, and emphasized the claims of those who served in it to better remuneration. In free land the government had the means of satisfying those claims in a way conducive to increased agricultural production.

With the exception of the British self-governing colonies, none of the governments now at war can offer free land, suitable for immediate occupation, to the returned soldier. The French peasant soldier may be expected to return to his holding, where he was contented beyond the ordinary lot of laboring humanity. The Russian peasant, practically an exploited serf before the revolution, may return as proprietor to the lands where formerly he labored for the benefit of others. The German Junker, the Hungarian or Rumanian magnate, the British possessor of latifundia, will call in vain to the returned soldiers to resume their old rôle of transformers of human energies into rents. And our own landed estates, great and small, will suffer in production from lack of suitable tenants and farm hands. Fewer men will be content to be perpetual tenants and farm hands. C'est la guerre.

It is plain that if the governments of the world are to apply the man power released from war to the production of food—as they must do unless they are to prove bankrupt in the most pressing of governmental problems—they will have to address themselves seriously to the work of agrarian reconstruction. They will have to reproduce by artificial means the conditions in which the landless man who is willing to engage in food production may have before him a secure prospect of ownership of a farm home in which he can live in decency and comfort. This is not a simple problem. It is one that requires careful and systematic preparations extending over a considerable period of time. There is no excuse for delay. We can not wait until the peace to dispose of the problem by legislative fiat when our minds are no longer occupied with warmaking. If nothing is done before the war ends, nothing can be done at all to meet the emergency of demobilization. We shall grapple with the problem of agrarian reorganization at a

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later and certainly at a far less convenient day.

What can be done and ought to be done is indicated by the land settlement project of California. Under that project the state is acquiring by purchase from private landowners a tract for subdivision into farms, of size and quality suitable for the comfortable maintenance of farm families. It is not the intention to transfer the land to settlers in a raw state, leaving it to the occupant to succeed in the rare instance or break his heart in the majority of cases, as in private land settlement schemes. Nor is it the intention of the state to provide productive farms that may later be nothing but investments for absentee landowners. The plan is so carefully safeguarded that only bona-fide farmers can get access to it. But it will be worth the bona-fide farmer's while. What he will get will be a farm fenced and equipped with buildings and with easy arrangements for stocking it and providing it with working implements. He will be able to take a crop off it the very first year. He will be subjected to no other burden than interest at five per cent of the cost of land and improvements, together with an additional percentage sufficient to clear up the debt on livestock in five years, on improvements in twenty years and on the land in forty years. He is expected to invest capital of his own ranging from $1,500 to $2,500 according to the size of the allotment—a condition that the federal government could afford to waive in the case of honorably discharged soldiers otherwise qualified. Prospective settlers must show proof of character and experience upon which their success may reasonably be predicted. But not everything is left to experience acquired in the haphazard methods of American farming. Provision is made for an expert agricultural adviser. Further, every inducement is offered to coöperative activity among the settlers.

The federal government would need to undertake colonization plans on a huge scale, to provide for hundreds of thousands, where the state of California, responding not to a national need but to the obvious business advantages of the plan, is working on only a small scale, providing for a few hundreds. There is nothing new in the technique required of the federal government, only nation-wide organization of the practical abilities required and the command of funds that appear insignificant in volume after the late expenditures for war. In one point the federal government has a marked advantage over the states. Its activities need not be confined to tracts purchased from private holders at great expense. In its reclamation projects it is improving public lands, or private lands the title to which has insignificant value apart from the increment resulting from the reclamation operations themselves. All these lands ought to be reserved for bona-fide settlers and ought to be placed in their hands, not, as in the past, as hideous squares of knoll and ditch, rubble and sand, on which the first generation of settlers ruin themselves in vain, but as farms ready to occupy, capable of nourishing their holders from the first year. It can be done. It has been done successfully by New South Wales in the remarkable Murrumbidgee Irrigation project, experience with which on the part of our foremost irrigation authority, Dr. Ellwood Mead, gave the first impetus to the California land settlement movement.

In most of the various reconstruction movements to which we shall be driven after the war many conflicts of interest are certain to emerge. No interests are jeopardized by a sane policy of agrarian reconstruction. Every one, even the holders of great landed estates, recognizes that the country's prosperity can be solidly based only upon a contented, farm-owning agricultural class. The system of farming through tenants or hired managers has, in principle, no defenders. It is tolerated because laissez faire produces it along with more socially expedient business consequences. There is no ground for believing that such a system will correct itself without state aid. The undesirable large land holding has nowhere given way to the desirable small holding, except under the stress of revolution, as in France, or through direct government action, as in Ireland. We are agreed that we must restore and retain the single family farm as our agricultural type. We do not want to attain this end through revolution or confiscation. We can attain it through a national policy of land settlement according to plans that have survived the experimental stage. And we need to adopt such a policy forthwith, before the disorders of an unplanned reconstruction press upon us.

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By Grace of Allied Policy

THE progress of mechanical invention has made the world one society: the evolution of men's minds has meanwhile fitted us to achieve happiness, certainly in a village community, possibly in a compact national state. Our bodies have annihilated space and acquired powers of locomotion and perception which remove us as far from the biped man as he is removed from the jelly fish: our social intelligence lags by some centuries behind this material evolution. We move, see, hear and act like a new species of world-ranging supermen: we think on the old provincial and national plane. The slow pace of our mental adaptation, the vertiginous speed of our material expansion—these are the two terms which explain the world tragedy of this war. Of this truism Russia is the most disturbing illustration. A military alliance links us physically to her, like alpinists tied over the same chasm by the same rope: the telegraph enables us, as it were, to see the outward show of what happens within her borders: finance gives to large numbers of our investors, bankers and capitalists, an intimate concern in all that she suffers and does. With all this, our press has reflected since last March a nearly total failure to understand the working of the Russian mind, and diplomacy was no better equipped. On her side, the incapacity of the revolutionary mass to grasp the intricacy of the world process is no less painfully obvious. These Russian Socialists, quick-witted, sensitive, sincere, idealistic, might make an earthly paradise of a village commune: they have had to steer an empire amid a world war. Misunderstanding has led to the common results of anger and suspicion on both sides: it is going to lead us into worse tragedies yet, unless some of us can achieve the feat of divination.

The problem of accounting for the Bolshevik revolution is something more intricate than an explanation of the Bolsheviki themselves. What we have to explain is not why they rose in revolt, but why they achieved success. They have acted after their kind and according to definition. For ten years they have stood apart from the other Russian Socialist parties and factions, cultivating in their isolation an unbending, doctrinaire, revolutionary creed. Their aim was always an instantaneous, catastrophic, social revolution. A political revolution, which substituted a republic for an autocracy, was for them merely a stimulus, an index to what might be achieved. Their internationalism amounted to color-blindness: they see and admit no differences among the warring capitalistic governments. They had always opposed any coöperation with middle-class elements. They had always advocated the dictatorship of the wage-earning proletariat. For this creed they had faced Siberia, exile, and the Tsar's "neck-tie." One need not pause to ask why they acted on it this November. Englishmen fail to understand, only because we have grown into the belief that a socialist necessarily resembles Mr. Shaw or Mr. Sidney Webb. In our bewilderment we ascribe these vagaries to German gold. German gold might explain why Lenine and Trotzky do things which are inconvenient to us today: it can not explain why for many a long year they had been doing things highly dangerous to themselves. If it should turn out (there is no proof of it) that the party has used German money, I should still contend that in its exalted fanaticism it was ready to use any means to its own end. Like Mirabeau it would say that it took money, but did not sell itself. I once met Lenine some ten years ago: no one could fail to perceive the unbending, self-moved, self-generated fanaticism of the man.

What we have to explain is not why Lenine acted, but why Lenine succeeded. In the early phases of the Russian revolution, the Bolsheviki were merely the outer fringe of its main body. None of its prestige belonged to them. Their leaders were in exile when it happened. Moderates like Tcheidze and Kerensky reaped the first glory of its achievements: the real hero was the nameless crowd of the garrison and factories of Petrograd. The soviets (councils of workers' and soldiers' delegates) elected in these early days, and periodically reëlected, contained only a harmless percentage of Bolsheviki.

The dominant majority was drawn from the various Socialist parties, which are content to follow an evolutionary strategy, which admit some distinction between allies and enemies, and are prepared to coöperate with Liberals. The overwhelming change in public opinion came in autumn, when the Bolsheviki became suddenly a majority in the workmen's soviets, not merely in Petrograd and Moscow, but in most of the larger towns of Central Russia. The Moderate Socialists held their own only in the non-Russian areas of the west and south. That is one measure of the veering of opinion. There is another. After the Korniloff adventure, Kerensky set up a provisional parliament, to which all the parties, soviets and municipalities sent delegates. It was to bridge the interval before the elected Constituent Assembly could

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meet. The voting power assigned to each element could only be arbitrarily fixed: Kerensky's critics said that this chamber was "packed." None the less, this chamber was so little satisfied with the Moderate conduct of affairs, that it gave Kerensky a vote of confidence which was really a defeat. He scored against a Bolshevik motion, out of over four hundred votes, a majority of less than twenty, while more than twenty members abstained. On the eve of their coup the Bolsheviki had unquestionably the urban masses and the active main body of the revolution behind them.

The Russian masses are not academic thinkers, and we may safely assume that they care nothing at all for Lenine's tall super-structure of Marxist logic. The veering of opinion from Moderates to Extremists was due to one simple fact. The Moderates had failed to give the masses peace and bread. One need not pause to inquire whether better organization might have provided bread without peace. In an advanced modern industrial state one may improvise an organization which will make war physically endurable for the masses. In a country which had at the best of times only the most slovenly and rudimentary organization, without either a feudal system or a numerous middle class, the task, amid war and revolution, is impossible. The starvation, the depreciation of currency, the fabulous rise of prices, the breakdown of railways, had all become well-nigh intolerable before the revolution. They were its cause. The aged locomotives, incapable of repair, were dropping out of use by hundreds each month, and in the villages there was a dearth even of spades and ploughs.

With most of the ports closed, and others congested, no help from American or British experts could have done more than touch the general collapse in one or two departments. Organization implies a long experience of associated work, in schools, factories and business, and this Russia lacked. Bread and peace had come to be synonymous terms. The only hope of feeding the towns lay in reducing, if not actually demobilizing, the devouring army at the front. Kerensky had already released one class. His war minister, Verkhovsky, proposed to demobilize a third of the army. We have learned since his fall that Kerensky was about to adopt an even more drastic expedient. He intended to release all unwilling conscripts, retaining at the front and under arms only those regiments which volunteered for continued service. That fact reveals with startling clearness how large a measure of agreement over facts there was between Kerensky and the Bolsheviki. Both knew that Russia was "worn-out." Both realized that the army was incapable, as a whole, of any positive contribution to the war. Both knew that it was impossible this winter to feed a great army at the front, and at the same time to find bread, fuel, clothing and boots for the masses in the towns. They differed, not in their reading of the facts and their perception of Russia's dire need, but solely in this, that Kerensky and the Moderates retained a sense of loyalty to the Allies. They did not want to break with the western democracies, and, at terrible sacrifices to themselves, they were willing to keep at the front a force which would compel the Austro-Germans to man their long eastern front.

In this passionate dramatic contest, through eight months of crisis between Moderates and Extremists, the Allied governments were the absent third. State the problem, if you please, in the narrowest terms of momentary self-interest. The task for us was to keep Russia at least passively within the Alliance. The penalty, if she should go out, is not merely that the Austro-Germans regain the free use of one hundred and twenty divisions from the eastern front, it is that the "siege" and the economic encirclement of the Alliance ceases on the eastern front. Here was a great stake to play for; it had to be won by political sagacity. Kerensky, facing a growing crowd, first of critics and then of rebels, who grew desperate as winter added the peril of cold to the peril of hunger, had just one card to play. He could appeal only to the sentiment of loyalty, and to the instinctive sympathy which newly liberated Russia felt for the older democracies of the west. While everything turned on this delicate sentimental factor, policy, chance or sheer ignorance spoiled our prospects at every turn. The more powerful newspapers in England and France were at first cold and then hostile to the revolution. The papers which were friendly, like the London Nation, were excluded from the mail-bags, and might not be quoted in telegrams.

When Russia, not merely because she honestly hated imperialism, but still more because she wished to shorten the war, gave up her admitted claim to Constantinople, and appealed to the Allies in their turn to drop all similar aims, the response was lacking. Each Ally made reservations and distinctions, and even the American Note was too vague to be helpful. I need not dwell upon the veto placed on the Stockholm Conference. One must have been in touch, as I was, at the critical moment, with delegates of the soviet, to realize what that meant. Stockholm was the Moderate expedient. The Bolsheviki were from the first opposed to it, and treated it with scepticism and disdain. When it failed, they turned round on the Moderates, with the inevitable and unanswerable

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"We told you so." They predicted from the first that Russia would fail to move the western Allies, and that if a mixed Socialist-Liberal coalition remained in power, it would be dragged, protesting but impotent, into a never-ending "Imperialist" war. The whole trend of events, and nearly every official utterance from London, Paris, and, may I add, from Washington, confirmed these Russian Socialists in their sense of isolation. Kerensky's offensive, undertaken in deference to Allied opinion, brought its dismal sequel of retreat. After Korniloff's coup, which the British and French press welcomed with delight, no Russian could retain any illusions about Kerensky's ability to influence his Allies.

All the while, a steady current of anxious criticism turned on the financial aspects of the Alliance. Russia inevitably was falling ever more deeply into foreign debt. She could not balance it, even partially, by exports. The natural consequence followed. Before the revolution and even after it, her immense undeveloped mineral resources, iron and coal, but especially copper, gold and platinum, were passing into foreign ownership. The banks, syndicates and mining companies, at first British and latterly American, multiplied as fast as the debt itself. It was a process of mortgage, and those who had foresight perceived that it might lead to some phase of open or disguised control. I will not quote the angry leading articles or the statistical demonstrations of this danger. The reader can supply his own commentary.

By autumn the chance that Kerensky, with the Moderate Socialists, would be able, against hunger and war-weariness, to beat back the Bolshevik opposition by appealing to the sentiment of loyalty, was slight, but he had still one card. In May the provisional government had invited the Allies to revise their war aims at a common conference. They hoped to eliminate the cruder purposes, to throw into relief the broader and humaner aims, and by moderating the program to shorten the war itself. The invitation was accepted, though without enthusiasm, and the date originally fixed for August. That month passed, and the next, and yet another. In the last days of October telegram after telegram told us how seriously Russia was taking this conference. The general council of all the soviets had drafted its sketch of a "democratic" program, a reasonable and moderate document. The Socialist ex-Minister Skobeleff was to attend as its delegate. On its side the government was discussing this program and its own variations to it; in the Provisional Parliament, sometimes in open and sometimes in secret sittings, the Foreign Secretary M. Terestchenko was debating it, point by point, with the representatives of all parties. The hopes dashed by the veto on Stockholm had revived, and against the sneers and threats of the Bolsheviki, the Moderates were working up the belief that Russia and the Allies would arrive at an agreement which would at once ennoble and shorten the war. In the midst of this flicker of optimism, came Mr. Bonar Law's statement from London, that the Paris Conference would consider the prosecution but not the aims of the war. When that telegram arrived, the battle for Russia's loyalty was lost. The Moderates had no longer an expedient left. The correspondent of the Manchester Guardian has stated categorically that it was only on the arrival of this news that the Bolsheviki determined on armed revolt.

The moral of this analysis is simple. In the struggle between Moderates and Extremists, the west has failed to realize that its own attitude was the determining factor. We expected Kerensky to achieve miracles, and failed to understand that some readiness on our part to recognize Russia's dire need was the condition of his success. The Moderates wanted a reasonably early peace, if it were consistent with honor, no less than the Extremists. They were ready to face protracted war, but only on condition that continued war was found to be unavoidable, after the moderate definition of war aims. All this is ancient history today, and I forbear to comment on a situation which must have changed before this article can reach New York.

I do not believe in the permanence of the Bolshevik dictatorship, but it is possible that before it falls, it may have so ruined the army that its successors may be unable to restore the former conditions. Another possibility is the disruption of Russia itself into independent fragments, which would be impotent to resist German pressure and penetration. If the fortunate solution should emerge from the chaos, if Russia gets by compromise or struggle a government which can hold her together and set up a Constituent Assembly, the key to the future is once more in our hands. The material need for peace and bread will be no less than it was. The task for diplomacy will be once more to make the appeal to loyalty plausible. Phrases are useless. Doles are inadequate. We have to convince Russia that if peace is unattainable today, the fault does not lie with our extravagant war-aims. The real issue, turns, it seems to me, on our ability to make a diplomatic use of economic pressure to enforce the military argument. Are we ready to say that "economic peace," at and after the settlement, will be our *quid pro quo* for the enemy's acceptance of our indispensable demands? It may already be too late to use that argument with its old cogency. If Russia breaks

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away from the Alliance, Germany is no longer hemmed in. We shall have less to offer and less to withhold in the shape of markets and raw materials. Professional diplomacy has broken down, as it commonly does in dealing with revolutions. This emergency calls for the insight of less conventional minds.

H. N. Brailsford.

London.

The Painting of Arthur B. Davies

O LYRIC Love, half angel and half bird, and all a wonder and a wan desire! This is not Browning though only one word is changed. The lines thus altered came to my mind as I thought of the exhibition of the pictures of Arthur B. Davies at the Macbeth Galleries. These pulsate with the gracious light of unenforcéd days. One is half inclined to eschew prose in writing a critique and to let singing lines of verse prolong the penciled melodies of line and color. The air that breathes out from these pictures is sweet with chaste delights. There is a calm of maiden meditation faintly tinged with lingering melancholy and "joy, whose hand is ever at his lips, bidding adieu."

There comes, however, a moment when the mood changes. The clarion call of the strenuous life invades the pastoral slopes, and intellectual passions flutter the dovecotes. Color insurgent, resurgent, agitates gentle limbs and lends to them a frenzy not their own. The artist's intellect attempts to lift him by his own bootstraps, as it were, and to kick him up the rocky slopes of arduous modernity. A star beckons from the abodes where cubists have their dwelling place.

Perhaps it could not have been otherwise. The echoes of sweet dreams could not have been indefinitely prolonged without degeneration, and, in the presence of the current world of art endeavor, intelligence has been inevitably driven to aspire to the chilly heights of intellectual formulations. What happened to Picasso, happened in turn to Davies. Both left the measure of their native feeling, in order that they might rise to standards of more impersonal, ideal altitudes. The thing that was to them in essence foreign and unreal, became the object of a fascinated attention. It was, and perhaps still continues, enormously attractive, because of its apparent illimitable potentialities, and so it drew, and perhaps still draws them on to ever wider circles of fatuity.

The heart, says Pascal, has its reasons that the intellect does not know. The modern artist, and sometimes also the modern critic, reverses this, and tells us that the intellect has its emotions that the heart does not feel, and even as Pascal with his great intellect was just the man to recognize the former truth, so it is precisely the emotional artists like Picasso and Davies that are like to provide the opposite. This might be cited in their justification as presumption of their greater insight, if there were not unfortunately a relevant difference. Pascal wrought his way to his own truth, while neither Picasso nor Davies would have discovered theirs for themselves in a thousand years. Pascal's intellect and his religious intuition were one another's peers, while Picasso, I know, and Davies, I suspect, though both finely intelligent, are intellectually inconsiderable.

Let us return to the Davies of his native, tender wood-notes. These are distinctive and of a rare felicity. There is especially frequent in his figures a note of impetuous hesitancy, an arrest of movement balanced on the toe of expectation. Such things are finer than his static themes in which the glamor is insufficiently secured by requisite bulk and weight, or than his later things where, in obedience to a gallant impulse toward achievement of more brilliant import, the movement increases to the double-quick. The rioting figures prove themselves to be, however, of something less than riotous blood, indeed at times they hardly seem to know the difference between rioting and writhing.

The distinctive value of form in Davies's pictures comes from their balance and their unity. His graceful figures have little power or weight, but they have in them a quality of almost equal worth and rareness, which is the ripple of life. His sometimes shadowy figures, shadowy, that is, as mass, get a full measure of validity because within their frail volumes they have veins flowing with a pale but genuinely circulating blood-stream. "Still, still to hear her tender-taken breath" we can exclaim at sight of many of his exquisite phantoms, poised upon the hillsides of his visionary land.

And in his landscapes also, there is the same quality. The trees, the hills, the water, and the sky, throb together in happy unison. Davies has woven many an exquisite spell and doubtless will weave many another, if only he can forego the structural elements invented out of hand to bridge the gap between his sensitive perception and pictorial geometry. The artist who can successfully cross that bridge has yet to be discovered. Perhaps we shall have to wait for one who, like Pascal, can make inventions in the world of mathematics and in that of emotional expression as well. At all events it is a satisfaction to see that some of Davies's latest things are sensitive and fluent drawing, with hardly more than traces of cubistic innovation.

Leo Stein.

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The Conditions of Peace

AT the end of the war the "terms of peace" will be settled; their formulation will depend on the success of future military operations which cannot be foreseen, and it is futile to discuss them yet. But the conditions to which these "terms" must conform, if they are to be permanent or even desirable, are already fixed by economic and political factors, and cannot be changed, though they may be obscured, by military success or failure. They may be stated in two sentences: the political units of Europe must be smaller and more numerous, and the economic units of the world must be larger and fewer, not owing to any new fact introduced by the war, but as belated recognition of a change which has already been recorded by history, and would have gone far to render the war unnecessary had it been perceived earlier.

Before the period of steam and mechanical power, each district of Europe was in the main self-supporting: commerce between districts consisted of the exchange of surplus products, not of necessities. These self-supporting districts were the economic units of social life, and many nations contained more than one. For political life the nation, not the economic district, was the unit, and the political units of Europe were necessarily larger in size and fewer in number than the economic units. Men therefore acquiesced without question in the subordination of economic questions to national politics. Then came the period of machinery, of railroads, of steamships, and of factories, and with it the character of the economic units of society was changed. Instead of consisting of districts relatively small in area, defined as a rule by geographical features, they were extended along the routes opened by the new methods of locomotion and manufacture. They became elongated to an extraordinary extent, and stretched not only across all the political frontiers which defined the nation, but even across one another. At the same time the increased ease of transport persuaded men to exchange necessities as well as surplus products, so that the curious result was reached that districts hitherto self-supporting came to rely on supplies from distant and sometimes alien countries, that the richer the country the more dependent on others it became, and that the accumulated wealth of the world began to increase incredibly, because each district was enabled to concentrate upon that which it could produce most efficiently. Life became more efficient, more profitable, more complex, and more dependent, and economic units became greater than political ones. The way of peace would have been to recognize this fact, and adopt some kind of economic international organization. But politicians, who had always worked on national lines, were loath to give up their old ideas, and tried to stretch political frontiers so that they should correspond with economic ones. Community of economic interests seemed to them to call for political union, and the union offered to small nations by great ones was the same as that once offered by the tiger to the lamb. Great nations, especially in central and eastern Europe, openly or secretly endeavored to dominate and absorb small nations, if necessary by force of arms, because it was evident that these nations belonged to the same economic unit, and the politicians' lack of imagination insisted that thenceforth they must also belong to some unit of political control.

More than anything else it has been this effort to force economic units into national boundaries, to stretch the political boundaries of the greater nations so as to include the smaller ones, and thus enable national councils to become the final arbiters of essentially international economic affairs—which has led to a war which, whatever be its military end, has already gone far to destroy the existing economic organization. In the pursuit of their object politicians constantly encouraged economic war; great nations were permanently jealous of each other's trade, forgetting that the result of all healthy trade—which is exchange—is that both parties tend to approximate to the same degree of wealth. It is possible by some methods of trading for one side temporarily to grow rich, and the other poor; but the apparent gain is ephemeral and illusory. No man is benefited by the bankruptcy of his best customers; the increase of their wealth tends inevitably to make for the increase of his own. Trade is not robbery: but many politicians seem to think that it is, and that consumers and producers live on each other, not for each other.

It was inevitable that sooner or later economic war and political intrigue should break out into military war. The immediate cause, and the direct blame, may be placed by politicians where they may choose; the final cause is an attitude which was shared by all nations, and the best chance for the future of the world is that we plead guilty, repent and reform. This is the true "condition" of peace, and it ought to be among the chief objects of American public opinion to see that it also forms part of the "terms" of peace. The reformation means in the first place the recognition by all civilized nations of each other's complete national and political freedom. Nations are groups of men living together, with a common tradition, either inherited or adopted, as to the past, a common hope for the future, and common customs in social, intellectual, and, to some extent, religious matters. These

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points men desire to control for themselves in their own way. There is no reason why civilized men should not do so; for they are matters which concern only themselves, and affect the welfare of no one else. The political freedom of the nations is therefore the first part of the conditions of peace; and to some extent there is no serious danger that this will not be generally recognized in America and in liberal circles everywhere. It is the basis of the "no annexation" cry of Russian and German socialists and radicals. It is at least an integral part of what is meant by saying that we are fighting for Democracy.

But by itself this will not be enough: the chief danger to progress is a failure to realize that the growth of the great European alliances was the subconscious recognition of the increase in size and changed nature of the economic units. The form which it took was bad, but the facts which it perceived were real. It will not be sufficient to undo the harm done by past policies of aggression by recognizing the political freedom of all nations, if we forget that the element of truth which inspired these policies was the solid and undeniable fact that economic frontiers had been moved beyond and across national boundaries. If the terms of peace remedy national aggression, but ignore the necessities of economic growth, they will be an illustration of the Dutch proverb which warns us against "emptying out the baby with the bath." The peace founded on such a basis will be illusory and short-lived.

To prevent this, two things are necessary: there must be a clear recognition that the economic units into which the world is divided, or will be divided, cannot be identified and must not be confused either with national or geographical units; and there must be constituted an international council for the permanent control of economic questions.

A nation is single and exclusive: no man can belong to two nations. A country—which is a geographical expression—has definite frontiers. A city cannot be in two countries. But economic units impose no such limitations: countries and even cities not only can, but often must belong to more than one economic unit, for economic units are based on trade routes, and trade routes intersect and cross each other. For instance, to take the most glaring example, in Europe Constantinople belongs not only to that great economic unit which includes the Black Sea, and stretches up into Russia and northwestern Asia, but also to the equally important unit which stretches from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf.

Under the "national" system of European politics the clash of interests between Germany and Russia, to say nothing of the Balkan states and Turkey, is obvious. But if this policy be abandoned, as it ought to be, the fact emerges clearly that whatever may be the political rights of the case, whether the city of Constantinople be locally controlled by Armenians, Greeks or Turks, or by a composite body representing all three, its economic position is international and must be governed not nationally but so as to do justice to both of the economic units to which it belongs. It cannot be exclusively German: that would be unfair to the economic unit stretching to the northeast—it cannot be exclusively Russian: that would be unfair to the economic unit stretching to the northwest. Still less can the economic interests of either Russia or Germany be controlled by Turks or Greeks. Economic units are realities: they are not to be treated as if they were national or geographical.

Above all, however, it is necessary that men should recognize the need of economic peace. That does not mean the abolition of tariffs, but it does mean the abolition of the use of tariffs for the undue advantage of one nation over another—robber tactics as against trade.

At the present moment England and France have suddenly realized not merely that they are, if not a single economic unit, at least very nearly so, but also that their economic life is bound up with that of America. Just as Central Europe is bound together by trans-European railroads, so America and western Europe are united by the trade route of the great trans-oceanic lines. Nevertheless, in the past the fact that the ocean divides politically though it unites economically has been the reason for economic war between America and Great Britain. It is our good fortune, rather than our virtue, which has prevented this economic war from becoming military. For the first time, and even now only partially, is there economic peace between the two coasts of the Atlantic, because the pressure of military and naval stress has rendered it necessary to conduct trade within this sphere—really a single economic unit—in the most efficient way, and not merely as an adjunct to national and political interests. Few conditions for peace are more important than that this state of things should be recognized: that economic peace be maintained; that the size and the fewness of the economic units of the world be admitted; that no attempt be made to force them into conformity with national frontiers.

But if this is to be accomplished, when the peace conference meets either it must never break up, but remain as the "standing committee" of the civilized world, or it must call such a body into existence. The conference of the Allies in Washington was a faint foreshadowing of what might be made permanent. To it—an international

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body—and not to every single nation, must be entrusted the control of great economic questions. On it should be the representations of all the districts concerned—which is equally important—and of all the interests involved—capital and labor, consumers and producers. The first duty of a league to enforce peace is to call for a cabinet to coördinate commerce.

K. POOLE.

Why Not?

IT is, therefore it cannot be otherwise. That is the point of view in general of my profession. We are about fifteen thousand strong. A small body compared with our sister profession, the teachers. Probably every reader of The New Republic knows directly or indirectly some librarian. That is my profession. I am one of the circa fifteen thousand librarians of this country. We sit in more or less beautiful buildings and think we think we are doing an indispensable bit for our country, state or town. Outside of these beautiful buildings the great world goes swirling by, an occasional spray comes spattering in and we on the inside are refreshed, we are " in touch " with the great swirling world. Every year millions of dollars are spent to maintain these beautiful buildings and to provide for us a milieu in which we may sit and think we think. Our immolated self-contemplation almost suggests the traditional Oriental, without the Oriental's magnificent and impressive aloofness. That we have not. On the average we are a lean fifteen thousand, forever prowling restlessly about our beautiful buildings, mothering little intentions.

When Frank A. Vanderlip a year ago made his frequently quoted and often misconstrued statement that the American nation is a nation of economic illiterates, he was speaking to us. He did not know it, but he was. He did not even know we were there to speak to.

When President Wilson put in motion great forces in the appointment of his now reorganized National Council of Defense he was trying to reach us. He did not know it, but he was. He did not even know we were there to be reached.

Every amalgamation of industrial forces, of economic forces, of promotive forces needs what we have to give. And heaven knows we need to give it. We are withering into a useless cult for want of contact with these forces, into shadows in a No-man's Land.

The American public library harbors within itself the germ of as fine a service development as is well-nigh conceivable. This germ is at present in imminent jeopardy of destruction by prolonged over-emphasis on our part of mechanical values, by a vision-less acceptance of mechanical values as ultimate factors. Why can we not see the propriety of the coördination of those potent inquisitorial forces operating so marvellously now in the world of affairs and of focusing them in this quasi radiator? Why not? What is there so very incongruous about taking just one more step and by so doing galvanizing the present inert mass into a pulsating service plant? Why should not public libraries be extra-territorial traders and establish market relations with the great outside world? Why not?

Some months ago, as is well known, the government inaugurated an elaborate system of inquiry into the finances, trade, resources, etc., of those countries with which the United States might enter into economic relations. Barely a day passes but some agent connected with this system calls upon me for assistance. Generally I am serving two or three of these agents simultaneously. As a rule I am obliged to deal not with a principal but with a representative. Let me illustrate the procedure in the case of a certain representative. This particular young woman was detailed to compile a statistical report on certain factors of the merchant marines of the belligerents and European neutrals. She had no notion and no instruction as to source material. I do not know how long she had floundered over the catalogue before she appealed to me. In explanation it should be said that these particular statistics form part of more general statistics and consequently do not appear in the catalogues, in the present stage of our cataloguing development, under the heading required by this searcher. When the young woman finally appealed to me she was in a state of perplexity. After conferring with her, it was not a difficult matter to put the required material before her. The point here is this: Having had sufficient initiative and intelligence to acquire this material and to be acquainted with its character, I admit a certain professional resentment not to be in more direct relations with the principal. Why, instead of instructing an agent, should I not act as the agent?

Another case. The Tariff Commission requests a busy Columbia professor to ascertain certain information concerning certain European free ports. The professor appeals to me. He uses up six or eight hours of his time making references to the material and forwards these to Washington. Again why should not the Tariff Commission have appealed directly to me? Simply because I am one of that army of fifteen thousand which consistently declines to function as a public service organization. Why?

ADELAIDE R. HASSE.

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Nearest Ready

GUNS and clothing are lacking for infantry and artillery, and Congress has discovered that the delay lies in army bureaus. Many have argued that a civilian department of supplies is superior to a military bureau, that England and France have found it so. Now we may for a moment look in a more hopeful direction. Which part of the army has done the best? Which will be closest to its schedule in appearing on the battle-field fully trained, completely equipped? The air service—or, technically, the Signal Corps. Which part of the army has been trained and supplied by a system most like that developed in England and France? The Signal Corps. That coincidence may be an accident. Perhaps the readiness of the air service is due to an easier task, or to better individuals, or to pure chance.

On the ground of present accomplishment, the expectations of the Signal Corps are:

1. Men—several hundred thousand aviators, observers, mechanicians, trained at ground schools and flying fields in the United States, Canada, England, France, Italy and Egypt—on time.

2. Planes—training, bombing, observation, combat, American-built according to the latest specifications—about two months late. (But the original program will be completed on time by the addition of surplus foreign-built planes, new planes which our Allies can make but cannot man.)

3. Motors—a full supply, designed and built in America since April—on time.

The men are recruited and trained by the military arm of the Corps, which, like all branches of the French and British armies, but unlike the American infantry, artillery and cavalry, has a single chief—Major General George O. Squier. The planes, motors and all other supplies are purchased by the equipment Division of the Corps, which contains scarcely a man who was in uniform before last summer. Its chief, Colonel Deeds, and his assistant, Colonel Montgomery, are both business men of large experience in organization and production.

General Squier, Colonel Deeds and Colonel Montgomery are all members of the Aircraft Board, of which Mr. Howard E. Coffin of the Hudson Motor Car Company is chairman. This board, under its original title, the Aircraft Production Board, was charged with "expanding and coördinating the industrial activities relating to aircraft" and was empowered to "facilitate generally the development of the air service." Now it is ordered to "supervise and direct the purchase, production and manufacture" of everything relating to the service. It includes, besides Mr. Coffin and the Signal Corps members, three naval officers and two civilians. If the man who actually signs the contracts, Colonel Deeds, did not wear a uniform, the Aircraft Board would amount to a civilian munitions ministry for the air service.

Compare this close organization with that of the field artillery. The training of the field artillery comes under no unitary control, but falls somewhere between the Adjutant General's office and the General Staff. Its equipment is the task of the Ordnance Bureau, whose chief is not a business man, but a regular army officer. Some business men were commissioned and taken into the Bureau, but others who remained civilians were put aside in the War Industries Board, given no powers, made advisory, and told to "coördinate." No acting executive of the Ordnance Bureau, no officer who orders material, is a member of the War Industries Board. The field artillery and the Signal Corps would have been parallel if General Crozier and the Ordnance Bureau had never existed, if there had been a Chief of Field Artillery, and if the proper committees of the War Industries Board had been given complete charge of producing and purchasing guns and explosives. In other words, they would have been parallel if there had been a ministry of munitions.

But perhaps it is not fair to compare the manufacture of artillery and ammunition with the manufacture of airplanes. Perhaps the Ordnance Bureau had the bigger task. There were appropriated for its use altogether about $942,000,000. There were appropriated for the Signal Corps about $640,000,000. These figures include only appropriations of the 65th Congress. They seem to favor ordnance. But if one compares the cost of a single great gun or a single charge for it with the cost of an equally important piece of air machinery, the difference vanishes. In point of number and variety of articles produced (for the articles include delicate instruments such as special cameras, barometers, altimeters, speed indicators and wireless apparatus as well as motors), in point of difficulty of design and manufacture, the Signal Corps has little advantage.

In his testimony before the Military Affairs Committee, General Crozier excused himself by saying that last year our army had almost no modern artillery, that his Bureau had to make entirely new equipment, had to expand about 3000 per cent. But the Signal Corps had to do more than that—it had to develop a new science and a new industry. In

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1910 there had been just one officer of the United States army assigned to aviation. When America declared war there was only one plant in the country fitted to build planes in quantity, and that had made nothing but training machines. At the same time the Signal Corps contained about 75 officers, and none of them had had manufacturing experience. In the Equipment Division alone there are now at headquarters about 200 officers and 500 civilians. As many more are scattered throughout the country. To speak at all of percentages in such growth is absurd.

But thin details of organization and statistics give no sense of the difference between the vitality of a producing body whose organs are sound and whose circulation is vigorous and that of one suffering from anæmia and arteriosclerosis. Only the comparison of specific performances will do that. No one would contend, for instance, that a capable machine gun is more difficult to design or to recognize than a capable air motor. But compare the attack of the Ordnance Bureau on the problem of machine guns with that of the Aircraft Board on the problem of motors. The Ordnance heads waited for the gun manufacturers to come and sell their product. They made a survey of existing facilities for the manufacture of existing designs. They argued and tested and delayed, and decided and redecided. They balanced one competitor against another. After weary months, a trusted inventor perfected a remarkable gun, and preparations to manufacture it were set going.

The Aircraft Board picked out the two best motor designers in the country, told them what kind of motor was required, furnished them with plans and models of all the most successful existing engines. It summoned to their aid the best automotive engineers, from competing firms. The men locked themselves in a room and completed rough plans within five days. Inside of a month the desired motor was set up and running. It was something hitherto unknown—an airplane motor of highest efficiency that could be standardized and made in quantity by machine process. A large part of the automobile industry was converted to the manufacture of the new engine. Finished Liberty Motors, made under factory conditions, were actually delivered about the time the rifle plants were cutting dies preparatory to the manufacture of Browning machine guns.

The Ordnance Bureau never encountered worse difficulties than did the Aircraft Board in the making of planes themselves. The science of aviation grows so rapidly that design succeeds design with a speed annoying to one who must plan for large-scale production. Blue-prints and specifications have to be altered continually. Materials, too, are troublesome. No fabric is so good for wings as linen. Linen is now available in large quantities from nowhere except Ireland. Negotiations for this supply had to be conducted with the British government; it had to be apportioned among all the nations desiring it. No wood is so good for the frame as spruce. The logging strikes in the Northwest were alone enough to account for the two months' delay. The Aircraft Board discovered that all the cut spruce in the country would scarcely be enough. It commandeered the Pacific coast output, and then made plans to cut more.

The Liberty Motor is so powerful that no lubricant can be used in it except castor oil. The Aircraft Board procured almost the whole supply in the country, imported castor beans from Bombay and other distant places, and finally encouraged more castor-bean raising in the South, by furnishing seed beans at cost and contracting for the product at a fixed price. And so on, through a long list of scarce raw materials and metals. Military secrecy does not permit a comparison of such activity with the efforts of the army to increase fundamental supplies necessary for explosives, but it may be said that although the War Industries Board has long known of serious deficiencies, it had no power to act, and those who had the power acted not at all or with astonishing delay.

There are as many able business men in the War Industries Board and the Ordnance Bureau as in the Aircraft Board and the Signal Corps. There are as faithful and intelligent officers. The organization of the air service is not perfect, and it has made mistakes. But it is right at bottom, and mainly it has done the kind of work that Europeans expect of the American genius. It began with energy and imagination, saw as a whole what might be done, and how it might be done. It got together everyone who could help in the task, and gave scope for enthusiastic teamwork under good leadership. It took the country into its confidence as much as possible, and created around itself the sort of air in which success is likely to grow. It laid down a project, and planned to the furthest detail the schedule according to which that project must be carried out. It put the right men at the right machinery. Good sense, technical ability and hard work are doing the rest.

There is nothing miraculous about the achievement of the air service. But it did have an advantage, a strange advantage, over the rest of the army. It was given almost nothing to begin with. It had to lay its own foundation. It was not obliged to tear down a stubborn old structure, or to build around it. After comparing the simple and natural process of its growth with the tortuous and painful involutions of the older army bureaus and their

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civilian advisory bodies, one is tempted to conclude that America would have been better prepared at this moment if there had been no army headquarters at all last April.

GEORGE SOULE.

Houses for Women War Workers

"WHAT will you do about housing women who are working in war industries?" an eager committee-member inquired of a war-housing expert "Why, house them the same as men, of course," he answered, "only put a fudge kitchenette on the first floor." And when she had laughed politely and was ready to go on to a serious discussion of the subject, she found that he had really nothing more to contribute.

There isn't much excuse for such an attitude. This man may not have been typical, but when one remembers the misplaced sinks that male architects inflict on women, one has doubts. Perhaps the whole question of housing war workers was so new that he hadn't had time to split it up into sexes, or perhaps he was so fierce a feminist that the drawing of any distinction seemed invidious. Still, the fudge kitchenette doesn't fit into this theory; and we have the testimony of Rebecca West, no meek defender of woman's rights herself, that "It must be admitted by even the most belligerent feminist that there are ways in which women must be protected because they are women."

Unmarried women workers, young or old, cannot flock into any kind of quarters, especially the haphazard quarters provided by an overcrowded town. In some cases, in many cases no doubt, there will not even be accommodations of the dubious sort, and the state or the municipality or the employer will have to meet the difficulty by building the houses. For all workers in general this necessity has been acknowledged, but no recognition has been made that the housing of women does constitute a separate problem. Surely no one is individualist or feminist enough to dispute that there are ways in which women must be protected because they are women. Aside from all other dangers, young girls cannot be expected to maintain their health and their working ability if they are forced to live where no sane provision is made for eating, sleeping and amusement.

Whether the state, the city or the employer is going to finance the enterprise of housing war workers, the federal government ought to adopt a standard of housing for women to which all building projects should conform. Such a standard has already been worked out by the Young Women's Christian Association. Some other group might equally well present a standard for government adoption, if it weren't for the fact that the Y. W. C. A. happens to have some fifty years of experience in the housing of girls on which to base its recommendations. The government cannot afford to wait until by laboratory work of its own it is able to determine how its girl employees ought to be housed. If there is an instrument at hand, it ought to be used. The Y. W. C. A. has made mistakes in the past. To some women of unfortunate experience the four letters mean only sectarianism, oppressive supervision, cheerless rooms and bread-pudding. But the National Board acknowledges that mistakes have been made, and for this very reason it has been able to develop a plan of housing for girls which shows the benefit of having learned by the process of trial and error. It must also be remembered that there is no question of letting the Y. W. C. A. manage any such national scheme, for the government is merely asked to adopt a standard.

The full description of this standard is contained in a pamphlet, illustrated with plans for the proposed buildings. The chief point made is that all women cannot be indiscriminately housed together. A certain amount of classification must be made. On all accounts it is better for the younger girls to live in large groups. They like the camaraderie of it, and they can have social life and opportunities for entertaining without being entirely free from the restrictions of their own homes. But this plan is not desirable for older women. Older women want and need independence, and they are able to look after their own housekeeping and cooking arrangements. The non-English speaking girls might constitute another group, at least temporarily, until under the care of a competent social worker they can associate profitably with the Americans.

In regard to the size of the units for younger girls, it has been found that one larger than 150 girls is difficult to manage. One smaller than 75 cannot be self-supporting, and it is essential for several reasons that the house shall be self-supporting. Independent girls detect and resent very quickly an odium in being the objects of even the best intentioned benevolence.

A building for use in places where only one building will be erected is already being constructed by the Y. W. C. A. near Charleston, S. C. With slight modifications it could be adapted for use anywhere. It is as attractive and convenient as any college dormitory. The bedrooms, eight by twelve feet in size, are all single rooms. Any one who has tried to divorce a roommate for incompatibility of temperament will realize how much this will help toward eliminating friction in the management of the house. Besides some bedrooms, there are on the first floor a dining room and recreation hall and several parlors. There is only one entrance for the residents, which makes it possible for the head of the house, in the office near the door, to see all incomings and outgoings. This arrangement helps to do away with many irritating rules, as does also the simple architectural expedient of having the parlors separated from the hall by arches instead of doors. Next to the dining room is a lavatory so that girls who come in from work in a hurry can wash their hands before eating.

On the second floor are bedrooms, a sitting room, a sewing room, a kitchenette and a laundry for the girls. Ample bathing facilities are of course provided. On the third floor are bedrooms and an infirmatory

Very similar to this is the plan for a building which is a unit of a whole industrial community, but here there is a separate recreation building. Parts of the community are a number of four family houses for groups of older women, who wish to live independently. Each apartment has a bathroom, a large combination kitchen and living room

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and three bedrooms. Each bedroom is large enough for two people. These groups provide for their own housekeeping, but they have, of course, the privileges of the central recreation building. Both the large buildings and the four-family houses can, if it seems desirable, be used as apartment houses later.

The plans submitted are worked out in much greater detail than there is space to describe, but perhaps enough has been quoted to show that here is a plan which is definite, and, in the best sense, profitable. The production vital to the government depends on the vitality of the workers. Most of the workers, be it clearly remembered, are going to be women. It will not be enough to acknowledge their femininity by endowing them with a fudge kitchenette. A special standard must be adopted for their housing, and the organization which can provide a satisfactory standard should be allowed to do so whether it happens to be the Y. W. C. A. or the Western Federation of Miners.

SIGNE K. TOKSVIG.

A COMMUNICATION

Unconstitutional Segregation

SIR: In declaring residential segregation of the races unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court has accorded a victory of great promise in the fight for fuller democracy within the nation. It is debatable who is the more to be congratulated: the Negro upon the vindication of his rights as a citizen or the cities of the country upon having had removed from them the incubus of segregation as a fact or at least a possible way of dodging the real solution of race relationship—coöperation between both races for the best interests of the whole community. But no debating point should be allowed to dim the unmixed joy which every Negro must feel, and which is echoed by every white man and woman who has realized the injustice and menace of segregation to all democratic ideals and national progress.

With no thought of imputing opportunism to the Supreme Court, its decision is timely indeed. On the one hand, for the first time in his history as a free man, the Negro has actually been sought after for his labor. This has led to a migration which in volume and in the unloosing of new and undirected forces is of serious interest to the nation, for the Negro has been quick to grasp his new value as a productive power, and this realization is making him more impatient than ever with our procrastinating policy of muddling through with our race problem. On the other hand, the influx of great masses of southern rural Negroes into northern industrial centers has developed almost overnight problems in labor adjustment, housing, and policing in scores of cities which have grown restive under the strain. The Supreme Court passed on the constitutionality of but one ordinance—that of Louisville, Ky.—but its decision threw out similar laws in St. Louis, Baltimore, and Richmond. South, north, and even west, of these border cities agitation was growing for the adoption of the same legislation, and there is no doubt that many another city had been allowing things to drift along, banking on segregation as the simple panacea once conditions had become so acute as to cause popular feeling to override its idealism. This more or less distinct idea that segregation was always at hand as a cure-all has done more than any other single factor to keep the colored districts of cities the country over a menace to the health, morality, and general decency of those cities and plague spots for race exploitation, friction, and riots.

In other words the Supreme Court's decision once and for all steers thought away from the compulsory Ghetto. The only other way for a community to turn, unless it is satisfied with letting the bad conditions of the present speedily grow worse, is in the direction of constructive social legislation for the whole community, impartial functioning of the municipal services under pain of a whole shifting of the colored population to better parts of the city if discrimination is continued, and, most important of all, coöperation of the best white and colored citizens in working for the best interests of their city. It was on this platform of coöperation that the National League on Urban Conditions among Negroes started a modest program in New York city some half dozen years ago. Already this work has spread to a score or more cities, and the present migration has increased greatly the number of inquiries from other fields which are feeling the need of organizing to meet their new problems. Naturally, the quality of the work done and the progress made vary with the intelligence and resources of each group of colored and white men and women, but the spirit of ignoring the color line to see the problems from a community perspective inspires all the work. Instead of restricting the Negro to a certain district by written or unwritten law and then in practice letting him rot there neglected, the efforts to better the life of the whole city naturally lead to making the colored sections healthy, well ordered, and generally attractive and therefore the place where the Negro will want to live.

Yet there lies an even deeper significance behind the Supreme Court's decision than this question of the future relationship of the two races in the cities. The Louisville ordinance made it an offense for a colored man to buy or rent property for purposes of residence or public assembly in a block where the majority of houses was used by whites; nor could the whites make use of property in districts predominantly colored, this latter restriction obviously being inserted to make the ordinance beautiful in the eyes of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it didn't, and in an opinion which will undoubtedly provide excellent material for yet more progressive decisions, Mr. Justice Day, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that the right of a citizen, white or black, to use or dispose of property to another, black or white, could not be interfered with by any such provisions as those in the compulsory segregation ordinance under review. Immediately there arises this question: If a Negro is upheld in his right to reside where he will,

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why is he denied the right to sit where he will in a public conveyance? To the layman the only answer possible seems to be: He can no longer be denied this right. That is why the Negro press in commenting upon the Louisville case says almost unanimously: "Now for Jim Crowism."

In this titanic struggle of nations the first thought of the leaders is morale behind the lines as well as in the trenches, for on morale depend the enthusiasm which makes for maximum production and the spirit of self-sacrifice which makes for the elimination of waste and of the unessential. What makes up morale cannot be conscripted or commandeered; it must be given voluntarily. That things have not been right in the South strikes home with greater force now that this distinctly agricultural section is found to be dependent to an important degree upon the rest of the country for its food supply. Negroes constitute one-third of the South's population and form the backbone of the farm labor. Ignoring the fundamental instincts of justice and democracy it would seem that anything which would make for an increased enthusiasm among ten millions of our citizens would be an intensely practical war policy. The segregation decision has already put new heart in the Negro, abolition of the Jim Crow cars would produce an even greater response. But the American electorate must remember that until it does away with all forms of "Jim Crowism" and removes that hypocritical qualification, "equal accommodations," from its conception of public rights and public privileges, it cannot expect unreserved enthusiasm and complete coöperation from the Negro whose potential contribution to the war and to the long, uphill struggle of the reconstruction to follow, is still sadly undeveloped.

WILLIAM H. BALDWIN, JR.

CORRESPONDENCE

War Along Business Lines

SIR: I have read your timely articles and editorials bearing on conditions in Washington with much interest, and know that all of your readers are grateful to you for placing this information at their disposal. It is admitted, to start with, that much has been accomplished, under the existing conditions, more, perhaps, than anyone could have expected. But, granting that, there is no reason why we should not do better. We have the painful experience of our Allies to guide us. Let us face matters squarely and with an open mind.

At present the primary need is reorganization at the top, and a curtailment of the power of the several bureaus, as such. This would involve first, an individual delimitation of power and authority; second, a close and real coördination of the activities of the several bureaus, including the Shipping Board and the Food and Fuel administrations, with the military plans and purposes of the General Staff; and, third, a complete overhauling of the personnel of the several bureaus, including the transfer of the older and more bureau-minded officers to the retired list or to field duty with troops, replacing them not necessarily with much younger men, but with men of broad vision, men not possessing the bureau type of mind, but bringing to their work the broad perspective of the whole service and an appreciation of the desirable relations and responsibilities that the particular bureau should bear to the whole service.

Just as the government as a whole has, with much confusion, delay and failure in high places, been expanded from an essentially peace-time organization to one that will carry on to victory in the greatest war in history, so, too, have the individual bureaus been expanded greatly beyond their peace-time organization with many added responsibilities and duties. In the case of the bureaus, chiefs of single-track minds, generally speaking, have remained in charge continuing, on account of years of routine, to do things in the old inefficient ways. And, to add to their difficulties, a great number of subordinates have been assigned to the several bureaus who are, in many cases, qualified neither by experience, training, education nor adaptability to properly, expeditiously and efficiently perform the duties assigned to them. Result—chaos, confusion, uncertainty and inefficiency. In many cases, the sole reason for their presence is that in the way of routine, they "got there first."

The existing conditions might be likened to those existing in a small business concern operating in an old and out-of-date manner, and with antiquated methods, but suddenly having unusual responsibilities thrust upon it, requiring an extensive enlargement of plant and facilities. The first logical step would be to replace the old management, if it failed to change its methods and operations to meet the new responsibilities, with a new management capable of measuring up to the conditions and thoroughly to reorganize the entire plant. Why should this not be done in our military organization when failure to meet new and increased responsibilities is evident! Politics, external and internal, is primarily responsible. Let us profit from our own experience in the Civil War and from the experience of our Allies in the present war. Congressional investigations are all right as far as they go, but if after having investigated they fail to remove the causes for inefficiency and delay, which every day cost lives and treasure, they are worse than useless. At present the bureaus are in politics, and are strongly intrenched in their positions by virtue of years of occupation and political prestige. The General Staff and its right arm, the War College, is in the shade of oblivion.

Let us reorganize the bureaus by delimiting and defining their functions and responsibilities and by coördinating their plans with those of the General Staff. Bring the General Staff and the War College out into the light and give them real responsibility and power by coördinating their plans and activities with the plans and activities of the bureaus. Follow the British system, modified as may seem best to fit our needs, by assigning a capable officer of the General Staff as a principal authorized assistant to the individual bureau chiefs, a man who will at the same time be in touch with the plans of the General Staff and have a knowledge of the ability of the particular bureau to meet the requirements of the General Staff's plans with necessary men, equipment, munitions, tonnage, food, etc. Place on the Supreme War Council only men who are qualified by achievement and experience, and who have the complete confidence of the people as a result of these qualifications. Create a secretary of munitions to coördinate the several departments responsible for the quick production and delivery of munitions. Why not, at one stride, concentrate supervision and responsibility? Go the whole distance and

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put all munition bureaus, including those responsible for munitions, clothing, food, transportation, under this secretary, and do it as quickly as possible, consistent with proper organization and the distribution of authority. Place capable civilians, under military control, in charge of the business features of all bureaus, such as purchasing, production, inspection, etc., as has been done in the Ordnance Department, leaving the old organization of the several bureaus free to devote its entire time to the technical requirements of the bureau.

This war is the biggest business proposition that has ever been known in this country. Let us make of it a business proposition managed along up-to-date business lines, and in full coöperation with military plans and policies. Put the best men where they can do the most good, regardless of age and political affiliation. Keep politics out from the start, and don't wait to eliminate it after many lives and much treasure have been sacrificed because of interference in the proper and efficient military and business prosecution of the war.

T. R. HAY.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Are We Blatant and Brutal?

SIR: It has been said that there are as many minds as men, and that there is no end to wrangling. Your editorial anent Mr. Vanderlip in your issue of December 22nd, vindicates this saying. It proves, as far as it can, that there are as many minds as men, and it certainly arouses in me the wrangling, if not the fighting spirit. The New Republic expresses such various opinions on the same subjects, from issue to issue, that I question both its sincerity and Americanism. Many of your editorials seem to me to veil by transparent camouflage, blatant pro-Germanism. The one in question is, to my way of thinking, so far from helpful suggestion as to partake of gratuitous criticism. Why did you not say that Mr. Vanderlip brought to Chicago precepts fine and to the point in this crisis in national affairs—precepts which every loyal American can and should endorse? Why did you not suggest *kindly* that the precepts *might* have carried more weight if conveyed in a different vehicle?—though Mr. Vanderlip can no doubt give satisfactory reasons for his mode of travel. Your assault on him in the last part of the editorial goes too far, it seems to me, even for times of peace. As I am informed, Mr. Vanderlip is a man of ability, who gave up a high salaried place to do, free of charge, what he can for his country—that he brought to the responsible office to which his government called him splendid qualifications for the discharge of its duties. Why then this brutal assault on him for discharging those duties as he thinks best?

C. B. ROLLINS.

Columbia, Missouri.

The Draft and the Working Girl

SIR: I should like to have it explained to me how a government which is making democracy its war cry justifies the undemocratic rules it has laid down for the draft classification. These rules provide that if a girl has ever been a working girl, she must continue to be one all her life, and if a girl has never been a working girl she need never be one. If a girl has had the misfortune to be born into a poor family so that she had to support herself, her husband is put into Class II, and she is told she can again support herself. If a girl has been fortunate enough to be born into a well-to-do family, so that she never has had to support herself, her husband is put into Class IV, and she is told that she need run no risk of having to support herself. Nor need she look to her well-to-do parents for any help. She keeps her home and her husband unconditionally.

I have an acquaintance whose father is one of the decidedly well-to-do men of the town. She never had to work, even in her own home. All she ever did was to have a good time. If her husband were taken, she would go back to her father's home (a few blocks from her present home), and she would continue to have an easy time. When her parents die, she will get half of their money. According to the rules laid down, this girl's husband goes into Class IV. She has never worked, and she has now no property of her own, so her husband is clearly in Class IV.

I myself come from a poor family. I had entirely to support myself, besides helping out the family, from the time I was nineteen. So my husband is put into Class II. If he is taken, I shall have to hunt a job and a hall bedroom in a cheap boarding house, and there I will have to stay for the rest of my life.

How can any one say that this is fair? Don't tell me that "It's a matter of expediency. A girl who never had worked wouldn't be able to support herself, and it isn't legal to compel her father to take her back." If her father won't take her back without being forced to, then let the girl prepare herself to support herself. She has at least six months in which to do it—as long a time as many a girl, who is now working, had in which to learn her trade.

I realize that this sounds ridiculous, but to me it seems that the really fair thing to do would be to compel all women who never have been usefully employed, to become so, and, if any one is to be allowed to retain a man's support, let it be the women who have already done their share of the world's work.

At any rate, don't penalize the working girl and favor the idle society girl at the same time you are howling for democracy.

J. G.

Taxes versus Loans

SIR: Arguments in favor of financing the war largely by loans are based on the idea that thereby we take part of the burden of taxation off from the present generation and put it on the future. This would be the fact if many of the bonds were sold abroad; and blind habit makes us think that it will be the same now when almost all of them have to be sold at home. As a matter of fact the loan is taking the same amount of money, at the same date, mainly from the same pockets, by compelling the same economies, as would have been the case if it had been a tax; and the process of repaying the loan will consist of taking from the American people as taxpayers in each year the amount that is to be paid in that year to the American people as bondholders. The only thing the loan does accomplish is to give the individual an opportunity to choose whether he will pay his tax now, by buying just enough bonds so that the interest he receives shall suffice to pay the extra taxes that he or his heirs will have to bear for the repayment of the loan, or whether he will postpone his tax by not buying so much, or whether he will make it an investment by buying more than that amount, so that in

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future he shall be the receiver of somebody else's taxes. This might be a fine thing if we could insure that the bonds should be taken most largely by those whose present power of payment bears the highest ratio to their future power of payment; but where an especially large investment is made by a man whose future power of payment will be just as much above that of his neighbors as is his present power, or where few or no bonds are bought by a man whose future power to pay will be comparatively no better than his present power, the loan is working the wrong way and a tax would have been better. Since the life and business of the present day is anyhow bearing the burden of finding this amount of cash for the war, it had better be found by tax than by loan unless we think it a good thing that those who are now taking few or no bonds shall for twenty-five years be loaded with taxes payable not to those who took just their share but to those who took an extra large share.

STEVEN T. BYINGTON.

Ballard Vale, Massachusetts.

Milk and Birth Control

SIR: This last notice of another increase in the price of milk brings more persistently before us the question: "How are the children of the poor faring?" What is the city doing to see that its children are getting proper nourishment?

It is absolutely essential that children up to the age of twelve, have from a pint to a quart of milk as a part of their daily diet, and, at the present prices, we all know that this is not possible, for the poor.

It is at once an hypocritical and sardonic government which withholds from them, both the knowledge of the limitation of families and the means with which to feed the hungry mouths of their children.

SHELBY CONVERSE.

New York City.

Votes for White Women?

SIR: In your issue of December 1st you print a letter with the heading: "Would the South let them?"

May I say a few words in reply? Mr. Allen says: "Though I am personally a believer in woman suffrage, I do not think it would be just or wise to force the policy on an unwilling South. Do you realize how much the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments are involved in this question? Those amendments guarantee—or were intended to guarantee—the suffrage to Negroes. The South has, however, practically nullified them and with the tacit consent of the North."

I must confess that I cannot follow the logic of saying in effect: We *seem* to be powerless to enfranchise the Negro women in the South; therefore the *white* women of the South must also remain disfranchised. I cannot see that the Negro women of the South are injured by the white women of the South winning the suffrage. They (the Negro women of the South) are not deprived of any right which they *now* possess. In the words of Mrs. Anna Howard Shaw: "They cannot lose a right which they have never had." By the same logic Mr. Allen might contend that the white males of the South must be disfranchised, because the Negro males are practically disfranchised.

We all know that the law books are full of statutes which are "dead letters," such as the blue laws in existence in several states. Lecky, in his History of Rationalism, shows how the laws against witchcraft remained on the statute book for many generations after the belief in witchcraft had died out. And yet the world moves on. It moves on even in the despised Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. The Supreme Court, after many, many years, has decided the so-called "Grandfather" laws unconstitutional, and recently it has also decided the laws making the segregation of Negroes imperative, unconstitutional. How about the Negro women in the North. If the suffrage amendment should give the suffrage to *all* the white women of the U. S., and to *all* the Negro women of the North, that would, at least, be a substantial gain.

S. L. FLEISHMAN.

Atlantic City, New Jersey.

German Is Infectious

SIR: Carl H. P. Thurston has indeed culled ineptitudes to support his sarcastic "Is German Infectious?"

It is infectious, and so is every other alien tongue taught in the public schools of America, and here is the real reason for suppressing the contagion.

A language is the epitome of race psychology. To relinquish one speech for that of another people is to obliterate race integrities that would never yield to force.

The Teutons have tried forcibly and unsuccessfully to eradicate the native tongues of subject peoples: the Anglo-Saxon has never attempted to impose his speech on outsiders, but he has amiably refused to learn theirs.

Anyone wishing to do business with him must speak English. After the war there will be no need for the German language outside the limited German boundaries. . . .

MARTHA LEONARD.

New York City.

Dr. Van Dyke's Martial Law

SIR: I waited until your next issue for some one fitter than I to notice the startling statement in Dr. Van Dyke's letter in The New Republic of December 22nd.: "It is by law civil in time of peace, *martial in time of war,* that the sacred and inalienable rights of men and the life of the republic must be protected." Italics mine.

This means either a call to the President to proclaim martial law, or a remarkable confusion in the mind of a scholar as to the meaning of martial law. It looks more like the latter. May I therefore remind your readers that civil law remains in force until martial law, which by the way, has no necessary connection with time of war, has been proclaimed; that we are not now living under martial law?

Shortly after reading this letter I came across the following: "Your mention of martial law in your last private letter really makes my flesh creep. * * * But martial law, which is only a fine name for the suspension of the law." This may be found Vol. II, page 328, book 5, chapter 6, Recollections of John Morley, one of the best exponents of that civilization for which we are fighting, and I beg any one interested in liberty and democracy to read this paragraph and to contrast it with Dr. Van Dyke's letter.

MARY MCMURTRIE.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

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At the Capitol

The Senate as Auctioneer

THE past week has been an active one for both houses of Congress. On Monday the Senate passed a bill for the development of the country's vast coal, oil and phosphate resources. On Tuesday both houses were addressed by the President on the status of international affairs. On Thursday, delivering the morning invocation in the House of Representatives, the Reverend Billy Sunday re-stated American war aims. And on the same day, by an exactly two-thirds majority, the House passed the federal woman suffrage amendment. Of this program only the first item has failed to receive wide attention. To the Senate's coal, oil and phosphate bill, public opinion has for the most part been indifferent.

Indifferent, in the first place, to the vastness of the public interest affected. We who make up the public own land that contains six hundred and fifty million barrels of oil. We own two million acres of phosphate reserves. We own four hundred and fifty billion tons of coal, of which fifty billion are bituminous tons that can be easily mined. These great stocks we want to see put to use: so that coal and oil and phosphates will be available to each of us, if we want it, at a lower cost than they have been in the past. This is "development," as it interests us. But we have, at the same time, plenty of evidence of what "trusts" can do in the way of charging prices, and of what "competition" can do in the way of waste and poor distribution. And we have our present experience of requiring, in a time of particular national peril, the ordinance of a federal Fuel Administrator and a federal Oil Administrator. And we have British labor's recent declaration that the public interest demands public development of basic natural resources. And the last thing that we as a public should want to do, would be to part altogether with these millions of acres of coal and oil and phosphate.

And that, under the terms of the bill which the Senate has just passed, is precisely what we are on the verge of doing. The Senate's bill provides a choice of alternatives: the Secretary of the Interior may either sell or lease these rich lands to prospectors. But the choice, in practice, will not be the Secretary's to make. It will be the investor's. And if the investor chooses to buy outright, the public in that transaction surrenders all control of output; control of waste; control of prices; control of labor conditions; and control, through rents and royalties, of profits. And in return for the surrender, what does it receive? Not even a certain assurance that the resources will promptly be developed. Under existing law, public mineral lands are valued for sale upon the basis of what they contain. Their selling price accordingly depends on the market price of the product. And this variable selling price discourages speculators from buying up the lands for their own purposes. Under the Senate's new program, however, any speculator may force the government into selling mineral lands by making application for them, and then, in the absence of another bidder, paying a fixed minimum purchase price. After that, his only obligation is to make certain formal improvements upon the land, which will cost him in the neighborhood of four dollars an acre, annually. Meantime he may hold the lands undeveloped, waiting for a profitable turnover.

There is, to be sure, an alternative to outright public sale. There is the alternative of a lease, if any prospector chooses to take that method of securing his property. But in the Senate's bill the lease provisions are no better than the sale provisions. No private landlord would draw a contract with as unnecessarily generous terms as the Senate offers to coal and oil and phosphate prospectors. Its bill makes no adequate provision for controlling the service that the lessee may give to the public or the price he may ask in return. It does not provide that when the investor has recovered all of his outlay, plus a full profit on his energy and capital, any additional increment shall be shared with the public. Its "recapture" clauses set up conditions which will make it exceedingly difficult for the public to recover the property it has loaned.

These leasing provisions, however, are not the last faults in the measure which the Senate has passed. There are several sections in the bill which go to the rescue of oil prospectors in the West. A number of these men claim to have suffered losses when President Taft, in 1910, took back into public ownership certain lands which had previously been open to private exploration. No doubt there are among these claimants certain deserving prospectors who have a right to expect federal relief. But the relief provided in the Senate's bill is not partial enough. It will open the door to all sorts of claims, vicious as well as honest. Many of the claimants are dummies for large corporations. So many, in fact, that Senator Reed Smoot, never an alarmist about the public interest, asserts that if the bill is enacted in its present form, "the Standard Oil Company will control at least four-fifths of all the oil in Wyoming, or at least twenty thousand acres of oil lands in the state."

There is no need for this sweeping sort of remedial legislation to be tacked onto a bill which should lay the careful ground-work for a policy of future conservation. The Senate is now waiting for the House to act, and the House can make a good beginning by cutting from the bill these equivocal sections and leaving relief to the courts, plus special legislation, if necessary, to take care of honest individual claims. The House now has pending a coal, oil and phosphate bill drawn by its own Public Lands Committee. It is a better bill. It does not provide for an outright sale of these rich public resources. It proposes instead a system of leases exclusively—not completely satisfactory leases, but considerably better than those provided in the Senate's bill. And if the House is given active support by its constituents and by the administration, it will have a good chance of forcing the Senate to give up its plan for sales and accept the principle of leases. In fact, if the House secures the right sort of encouragement it may even go so far as to accompany the leasing system with a provision that would give the government power to operate its own mineral and oil deposits, where it was a clear advantage to the public to do so. Under pressure from the administration, Congress wrote such a provision into one "development" bill, passed last summer. Every experience of the present and outlook for the future points to the wisdom of making similar provision in the present bill, before another great part of our mineral wealth is allowed to slip permanently away from the public domain.

There is no one who does not admit that in the past we have grossly mismanaged our public domain. If we still had in our national possession the natural resources with which we have recklessly endowed private speculation, we should have a solid basis on which to proceed with the work of reconstruction after the war. Is it not almost incredible that at a time when these facts are at last permeating the public consciousness, our representatives at Washington should be proceeding calmly to alienate the resources still remaining to us?

C. M.

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Books and Things

A FORTNIGHT ago, when I read Percy Mackaye's letter to The New Republic, I had not had the other pleasure of reading Young France and New America, by Pierre de Lanux. When I found Mr. Mackaye saying that M. de Lanux brought "us a challenge—a challenge to create," it never occurred to me that these words were closely descriptive. I recollected too many of the many other things which have been so fortunate as to challenge the creator in Mr. Mackaye—a tale by Hawthorne, a play by Shakespeare, a fragment of Sappho, an oaken table, a European war, a waiters' strike at St. Louis. "After all," I imagined myself saying to Mr. Mackaye, "what have you told me about a book when you've said it calls upon you to exercise your creative faculties? You have not characterized it. You have attributed to it a power which it shares with the rest of the universe. You have merely named the greatest common denominator of this book and of all things visible and invisible. Of course it challenges you to create. Vous êtes orfèvre, Monsieur Josse."

Tonight, after finishing Young France and New America, I am forced to apologize to Mr. Mackaye, and to admit that he did not read this challenge into it. His judgment was not subjective. The challenge is objectively there. "In the instance of our two countries," says M. de Lanux, "this is how I understand our literary relations: The greatest need for France"—he is looking forward to peace after war—"will be to feel the abundant, vigorous, generous production of your young writers whose inspiration is related to her own. If we happen to hesitate they will reassure us, owing to their solid virtue of genuine and direct inspiration." Many of us know M. de Lanux as an expert in the politics and languages of the Balkans. The passage just quoted reveals him as no less an expert in amiability. He expects from America, and very soon too, "some great artistic revelations." Until I came upon another sentence, near the end of his book, I was afraid we might not justify M. de Lanux's good opinion of us: "This interchange of art and artists may well be expected to increase after the war, and parenthetically it may be said that the counsels of Whitney Warren and other American architects will be profoundly appreciated when the work of rebuilding ravaged France is taken in hand." Emphasize this parenthesis, and you will acknowledge that the standard M. de Lanux sets up for us, if it be the same in letters as in architecture, is not impossibly high.

By this time you will have guessed my opinion, though you may not share in it: I think M. de Lanux writes about us with too obvious a will to be kind. What he says of America's coming influence upon French art, literary and plastic, may be true or may be mistaken, but certainly, to my taste, it is written by too glad a hand. Other parts of his book, however, are wholly free from this taint. He makes us desire a better acquaintance with a younger generation of French writers than those who are the subjects of Miss Lowell's Six French Poets—with Péguy, Vildrac, Henri Franck, Ghéon, André Suarès, Pierre Hamp, Rivière, Duhamel. He is such a competent and engaging literary critic that one cannot help wishing he would give us another book, in which he could describe more fully the younger writers who have so deeply influenced the younger Frenchmen who are fighting this war. Listen to him on two of the older men whom Miss Lowell has included in her volume, on Verhaeren first: "His voice rapped out words that, with a gesture, he seemed to fling into space. He tramped forward, shoulders rounded, like the abutment of an arch, as one ready to push forward something heavy. . . . Above all, his work weighs. His most largely winged verses are always cut from hard metal, and those most charged with divine spirit are in solid blocks, four-sided, like the masonry of a cathedral. . . . The heart of the poet traverses and expresses the most tragic crises. Strenuous conflicts and stormy images torment the soul and suspend it in space." How imaginative and admirable! Yet no better in its kind than this: "Let us then travel to the southern extremity of France. At the foot of the Pyrénées is a sunny little town, Orthez. There we find the poet Francis Jammes, who loves the poor, the animals, the gardens, the seasons, the young girls and the other things of God. He writes about them simple poems where the blood of Virgil runs and sings."

Even more interesting is the book's first chapter, where M. de Lanux describes the successive states of mind of those Frenchmen, his contemporaries, who were born much too late to remember the days of 1870 and 1871; their hopes, their masters, their impatiences, and finally, as more and more clearly they saw how Germany threatened France, their determination to live in a world set free from fear.

Here indeed is a new France, new even to those of us who did not know the old. Some idea of France we had, an idea generalized from a little knowledge and much ignorance, and it is against this generalized background, familiar and ill-seen, that we see these newer Frenchmen, perhaps no more justly. They are not more serious than the older generations, but their seriousness is nearer the surface, they spend themselves less in mockery, they are less afraid of being bored, they see less merit in living so as to escape boredom, they are not afraid of being duped, except by life through failure to understand it. Their malice is less, or less often a weapon, a gift that they are too busy to cultivate. Let our touch be heavier on the keys of life, they seem to say, if life will not sound its most authentic tones in answer to any lighter touch. For the sake of truth, of sincerity, they are willing to make more and more sacrifices —of pleasure to themselves from life, of pleasure from their art to others. Tired of mere cleverness, of mere dexterity, they seek new and significant forms in art and in life, and appear at first too tolerant of lack of form. They are less rusés, superficially, than the older generation, but even more resolved to see things as they are. Esteeming science no less, they know its place in life more accurately, do not expect from it more than it can give. A deep religious current runs through them all, believers and unbelievers alike. Their desire to be strong has not killed in them their fathers' desire to let live.

Pierre de Lanux himself belongs to this newer generation. He represents what is best in it by his wide interests —in sport, travel, business, foreign lands and foreign tongues—and by his ability to see all these interests as one, as a desire to enrich French life and to do what he can toward spreading French civilization wherever its humanity and tolerance will be welcomed. Hopeful, and the author of a very hopeful book, his interest in the future never leads him to forget the present, its gravity or its passion. He knows there is a generation not only younger but newer than his own. "Le Bleuet," he writes, "is the young soldier from the classes of 1914, '15, '16, '17, called during the war. He is now from eighteen to twenty-two. The young man who is now about to enter the fight, after he had had three years of moral preparation through the fight carried on by his elders, is a new kind of man. He grew up aware of the near presence of death." P. L.

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The Empire of Confusion

Austria-Hungary, the Polyglot Empire. By Wolf von Schierbrand. New York: The Frederick A. Stokes Company. $3.00.

THE problem of Austria-Hungary is now our problem and to gain an adequate conception of it is one of the new international duties of the American citizen. It is an exacting duty. Where shall we turn for an unbiased account of the discontented lands chained together against their will under the incompetent and reactionary House of Hapsburg? Not to the writers who claim Austria-Hungary as their home, for each, we shall find, is full of the grievances of his own nationality, whether German Magyar, Czech, Pole, Ruthenian, Rumanian, Serb, Slovak, Italian, Ladiner, to mention only the more familiar aggrieved races. Not to the writers of Germany or Russia or France, for they convict themselves of partisanship at the earliest opportunity. Not to our own writers, whose familiarity with Austro-Hungarian conditions is as a rule of the most shadowy character. We may as well accept the condition that all testimony we shall hear is biased and misleading, but much of it useful if taken with salt.

Wolf von Schierbrand goes well with a little salt. He is an international journalist of repute, with the usual journalistic ambition to influence public sentiment, corrected more or less by the necessity of being interesting. His account of Austria-Hungary is indeed very interesting. It is palpably sincere, except for its style, which cracks from time to time through straining at high dramatic effect. "The air was at white heat. An electric spark would have set it ablaze. But Tisza faced his foes like a lion. He bore the brunt of the spirited debate that followed. No insulting epithet fell from the lips of any of the speakers. Tisza's henchmen were like a Roman cohort. No break could be made in their ranks. They stood to their doughty leader like good men and true. The magic of numbers was with them, and they knew it. And victory perched on their banners." Tisza, let it be understood, was being attacked by Andrassy, Karolyi and Apponyi because of his failure to reform the franchise. He made no appeal to the armed guard to put the protesters out, for the simple reason that he knew he had a solid majority behind him—"the magic of numbers," in Wolf von Schierbrand's prose-poetry.

There is much of this sort of thing in the book, but only an ill humored reader will grumble about it. Moreover, only an ill humored reader will be repelled by Wolf von Schierbrand's German bias. In his opinion the Germans in Austria are the source of whatever energy, thrift, progress and good order are to be found there. How about the Czechs, some pan-Slavist demands indignantly. Well, it is true that they are energetic, thrifty, progressive and orderly—contrary to the nature of the Slavs. Why? Because of their intimate if inharmonious association with the Germans. There ought to be a common language for the empire. If you travel from Hungary into Croatia on the state railway you can't even get a glass of "liquid refreshments" if you don't happen to know the Jugo-Slav word for beer. Neither German nor Hungarian nor Czech nor gesticulation will penetrate the unwilling intelligence of the Croatian waiter. This is plainly all wrong; let each nation know its own tongue, and a common tongue besides. What should this tongue be? German, of course, for are there not eight officially recognized languages in the Empire?

How they hate each other, those racial fragments of Austria-Hungary. The Magyars, though according to Wolf von Schierbrand a superlatively sterling people with a backbone of lesser nobility, detest the Germans so cordially that they have to be kept apart from them even in desperate conflict with the common foe. Rumanians and Serbs and Croatians hate the Magyars; Italians and Ladiners hate each other and both hate the Germans; Czech and German live on hate in Bohemia; in Galicia the Pole hates the German and the Ruthenian hates the Pole. The one bond among all these hating races is their common loyalty to that almost miraculously worthless House of Hapsburg. In the 650 years since Rudolf of Hapsburg laid the foundations of imperial power, there has not been one single Hapsburg monarch whose aims served the best interests of his peoples. Not one single monarch of the line has cared for anything but his own personal and family interests. It is amazing that a race of hawks could breed so true; you feel like disputing on general principles Wolf von Schierbrand's sweeping indictment of the line. But if you reflect on Austrian history you know that the indictment will hold. Even the late Francis Joseph, even the present emperor-king, mild and humane as he is, cherished the belief that all this colossal sacrifice of war is merely to safeguard their own personal and family interests. And loyalty to such as these is the only bond between the nationalities of the empire. No wonder the empire totters.

The lands of the empire are pleasant lands, rich and varied. The peoples are endowed with remarkable gifts. But poverty and illiteracy are the lot of the majority. Agriculture is primitive. Mineral resources have not been surveyed. The remarkable wealth of water power runs to waste. For this state of affairs the responsibility rests partly with a grasping and incompetent monarch and a time-killing bureaucracy. "It has been calculated that to transact such a small thing as the making out of a tax receipt, twenty-three officials have to have a finger in the pie, with as many signatures, counter-signatures, errors, beginnings all over again and final adjustments." Sometimes when one feels despondent about Washington, it is a healthy thing to read about Vienna. Relatively considered, we have an efficient government, after all.

But the difficulty with Austria-Hungary lies deeper than the autocracy and bureaucracy. The dislike of each nationality for its neighbors would manifest itself, however benign the monarchy, however competent and energetic the administration might be. The dislike is well grounded. Each race, when it gets a chance, oppresses the others shamelessly. At the present the Germans are the oppressors in Austria, the Magyars in Hungary. Give Czechs or Jugoslavs or Rumanians or Poles a chance, and they would be oppressors. Even as matters stand, there is a Czechesizing policy in Bohemia as there is a Magyarizing policy in Hungary.

Imperial stability, however, would be greatly improved if the oppression were not operated through minorities, as now. The Germans are a minority in Austria, the Magyars in Hungary. If this dual empire of minority oppression gave way to a federated empire, in which each nationality would be autonomous on the soil where it prevails, the foundation would be laid for a better future of the state. This is the solution Wolf von Schierbrand offers.

It is not an ideal solution. Transylvania is prevailingly Rumanian, but there are German communities in it that would not fare especially well under Rumanian autonomy. The Germans of Bohemia would not fare well under Czech autonomy. But possibly the empire in divesting itself of the functions that belong properly to the autonomous

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states, might reserve the power needful to defend the national minorities. And further, if the empire is pried out of its medieval ruts and turns to the acceptance of the obligations of a modern democratic state, the nationality problem may lose its political preponderance. There are economic issues enough to keep the politicians of the empire fruitfully occupied: reform of land tenure, education, labor legislation. Such issues are bound to define themselves, as soon as the problems of autonomy and federation have been solved.

The present war, in the opinion of Wolf von Schierbrand, operates as a powerful unifying force. On this point his evidence is not especially convincing. Better evidence is offered of the democratizing influence of the war. Common losses, and the common misery of year upon year of semi-starvation, lay a broad foundation for change in political ideals, and any change in Austrian political ideals must necessarily be for the better. The Hapsburgs may think this is their war, but the people have a different view; and in attaining this view they have gained a clearer insight into the hollowness of the pretensions of the Hapsburgs and the hereditary nobles and the bureaucrats who have devoured the state while taking to themselves credit for its continued existence.

A. J.

Ezra Pound and Others

Lustra, by Ezra Pound. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $1.50.

The Wind in the Corn, by Edith Franklin Wyatt. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $1.00.

The Chinese Nightingale and Other Poems, by Vachel Lindsay. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.25.

My Ship and Other Verses, by Edmund Leamy. New York: John Lane Co. $1.00.

WHITMAN and the French poets of the decadence make strange companions. There is no real congruity between them excepting perhaps in certain similarities of outward form. Only those could be deceived into thinking so to whom literature is the dress it wears, who judge completely by externals. For in essence nothing could be more separate, opposed and hostile than the spirit of Whitman, with its emphasis on and choice of the new, the rugged, even the crude and blatant, and that delicate weariness of spirit, seeking new gratifications in fastidious perversions and subtle violences, which is French poetry of the decadence. Nothing better summarizes all that Whitman was in revolt against. If there is any union between them it is simply that the decadent spirit is seeking in this unnatural commerce with its opposite a new sensation. One wonders what the ghost of Whitman must say: Whitman the sturdy declaimer against influences from abroad; the vigorous adversary of all imitation (except perhaps of Whitman); the staunch advocate of every man's being himself foremost, and after that national. What must he say to the strange hybrid of cosmopolitanism and exotic influences he has helped to bring into the world?

But what, then, is the decadent spirit, and why does it almost inevitably lead to weariness and disillusion, whether it be in Greece, Rome or modern times, seeming to contain at birth the very seeds of its own destruction? Roughly speaking, one may say that the decadent spirit is that philosophy of life and art which sees values in the universe only in so far as they are æsthetic values, which denies that there is anything valid in the world, not alone superior or inferior to, but even other than, æsthetic values. Things have existence and reality, accordingly, only in so far as they have worth for art or by reason of it. As a philosophy of life it gives no firm standards of conduct, and so leads to excess, cynicism and weariness. As a philosophy of art it constricts the world, so turning art back upon itself. But art cannot be its own inspiration, subject-matter and expression, all in one. It is that for criticism alone. Paradoxical as it may sound, though art can and ought to fill the life of an artist, for his work, his art, it is not enough. The decadent spirit does not believe this. It too often confuses art and Bohemianism, and embraces the latter. But Bohemianism is a theory, and nothing kills art sooner than a theory. The decadents realize this as far as concerns academicism, which is old theory, but stop at full recognition of the principle and accept new theory.

Of adherents to the "new" theory of the day, which would compound decadence with Whitman, Ezra Pound is chief, in light as well as leading. Mr. Pound is a poet whose accomplishment to date does not wholly or justly display his powers. All the more is it a pity that his latest work should so overwhelmingly illustrate the effect of decadent influence as it works for the constriction of both life and art, for cynicism and sterility. Lustra does more than force the painful conclusion of deterioration: it reveals the actual process, the poems written before 1911 being separated from those composed later. Rarely is it possible to see in one book so sharp a line of cleavage, so complete a superiority of periods as Mr. Pound lets us witness by his act of separation. Before 1911 life still stung Mr. Pound. He had ardors, sufferings, visions and endurances. In his later poems, there is melancholy testimony of real shrinkage in his inspiration and his art. *Tout le reste est littérature,* sang Verlaine, and "literary" in this sense Mr. Pound's new work is. His art has come back upon itself. It is full of "literary" allusions and effects. Too often the poet is one of those who write the Gallic *sal* with an *e*. His work has cooled and hardened; cynicism has crept in. In craftsmanship, viewed unnaturally as a thing isolated, there is sometimes improvement, but native heat is lacking. Mr. Pound is most successful in his translations simply for the reason that the original supplements his really fine and sensitive artistry with a missing fire. His pieces from the classics, the beautiful Leopardi rendering called Her Monument, even the Cathay paraphrases, all prove the point.

For atrophy of the æsthetic values is bound to follow the loss or stunting by an artist of other values. The truth is that neither can with impunity be immured or aggrandized at the expense of the other. It is the same whether the world or an artist make the attempt. Life is impoverished, and with life art. So the world seems to have grown smaller for Mr. Pound. His interest has contracted to an attitude. He questions, he feels, less. Therefore song does not come. He does, instead, the stock French thing of chinoiseries, vignettes, etc., which seem new only because Anglo-Saxons generally know so little of French literature. When content has become for an artist merely something to inflate and display form with, then the petty serves as well as the great, the ignoble equally with the lofty, the unlovely like the beautiful, the sordid as the clean. For the purpose anything does. Values become lost or blurred and all things are regarded as intrinsically equal. Real feeling consequently becomes rarer, and the artist descends to trivialities of observation, vagaries

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of assertion, or mere bravado of standards and expression,—pure tilting at convention. So Mr. Pound has his Les Millwin, The Tea Shop, The Black Slippers and a goodly number of similar pieces, either idle, large in manner or defiant for effect. He exercises his no inconsiderable technical gifts on details quite unworthy of them, for one reason or another, when he can—or could—write poems as beautiful as

A VIRGINAL.

No, no! Go from me. I have left her lately.
I will not spoil my sheath with lesser brightness,
For my surrounding air has a new lightness;
Slight are her arms, yet they have bound me straitly
And left me cloaked as with a gauze of æther;
As with sweet leaves; as with a subtle clearness.
Oh, I have picked up magic in her nearness
To sheathe me half in half the things that sheathe her.

No, no! Go from me. I have still the flavour,
Soft as spring wind that's come from birchen bowers.
Green come the shoots, aye April in the branches,
As winter's wound with her slight hand she staunches,
Hath of the trees a likeness of the savour:
As white their bark, so white this lady's hours.

Surely Mr. Pound need not fear to be cool, unsophisticated, serious or pure-thoughted in his writing. It will not be mistaken for weakness, either mental or artistic. Mr. Pound would perhaps be the first to condemn writing with a purpose. Yet he does commit this very error—made no better because too often his purpose is *pour épater les bourgeois.*

I have dwelt at such length on Mr. Pound because of his abilities and considerable influence in the "New Movement" in this country. The situation is anomalous because Whitman is in no small degree the cause and inspiration of this "school." Yet no one could be less "American" than Mr. Pound, who is European in everything except actual birth and, perhaps, the condition of being so European. Certainly, despite A Pact, Salutation and Salutation the Second he has followed Whitman little. Nobody, on the other hand, could mistake Miss Wyatt and Mr. Lindsay for anything but Americans. Miss Wyatt particularly derives a genuine inspiration from her country both as a nation and a geographical expression. She really has captured something of its thoughts and moods, its variety and manifold poetry. She has had generous success in her aim, and of no artist is it possible to say much more. In Winter Wheat, for instance, sounds the gray drizzle of the slanting sleet over miles of wintry plain lands. In other poems it is some different aspect of the land. But in November in the City rings a deeper and more vibrant music, with a universality and insight that mark it from her other poems.

Mr. Lindsay is more ingenuous and ingenious. People rather than the land inspire his songs. Yet save for The Chinese Nightingale and How I Walked Alone in the Jungles of Heaven his work tends to be rather good fun or bizarre fancy than poetry. In his specialty, however, as they say in trade journals, he maintains a high level of excellence and production.

Mr. Leamy sings sweetly his unaffected songs of gentle and kindly sentiment, old memories, wandering and the home-spirit, seen tenderly through mellowing mists of revery and dream.

M. T.

Peace, Patriotism, and the State

Social and International Ideals, by Bernard Bosanquet. New York: The Macmillan Company. $2.25.

IF we had not happily learned from G. K. Chesterton that a paradox may be but a playful disguise of homely wisdom, the paradox of Bosanquet's book might mislead us into throwing it aside unread. The preface tells us that it is "a book about the enduring conditions of peace, and the production of an atmosphere unfavorable to war in the future." With our minds full of clamorous discussions of the rights of small nations, of territorial adjustments, strategic frontiers, balances of power, economic wars after the war, arbitration, disarmament, leagues of peace—we naturally expect to hear more of these topics. Instead, we find sixteen essays, only two of which profess in their titles to be concerned with patriotism and the state, while the rest deal with such apparently irrelevant subjects as Atomism in History, Is Compensation Necessary to Optimism? True and False Idealism, The Meaning of "Ideal" and "Charity," The Affinity of Philosophy and Casework, etc. Fully half the essays were written before the war, and even those written since its outbreak contain only incidental allusions to its specific problems. The main topic of discussion is social work and social reform, with frequent appeals to the author's own experience of charity organization work in London. Many a reader, not perceiving the author's drift, may not read far enough to discover that The Wisdom of Naaman's Servants is a passionate defense of the thesis that "the state is the great moral force of the world."

Yet here we have the precious kernel of wisdom in the hard nut of paradox. It is a startling thesis, especially at the present time when the institution of the state is on all sides being weighed and found wanting; when some critics accuse it of being inherently dangerous, and others of being inherently immoral. Bertrand Russell, writing in the Masses, in his most acid mood, told us that a state is nothing but a collection of elderly middle-class gentlemen in control of power, gambling with the lives of their fellows. Or, with larger perspective, in Why Men Fight, he makes it the incarnation of men's possessive impulses which, aiming at things that cannot be shared, lead to competition, aggression, war, and destruction. But whereas Russell seeks to escape from the state, as a force making for evil, by building life on the creative impulses of men which aim at non-competitive goods, other critics are interested rather in devising means for bringing the state under control and clipping its power for mischief. In either case, the wild beast theory of the state is accepted, and whether the control is effected by making the wild beasts tame each other in a league of peace, or by setting up a world-state leviathan, which must perforce be tame, having nothing left to fight—matters little in principle. Sanest and most helpful are those critics who, like the "federalists" not unknown to readers of The New Republic, propose, not to supersede states by some mightier international authority, but rather to decentralize them. Suspicious of concentrations of power, they would parcel out sovereignty and, so to speak, put it in commission, giving fuller scope thereby to the many diverse loyalties (often conflicting with loyalty to the state) which make every individual a member of many sorts of communities, some falling wholly within his state, some transcending its boundaries.

Amidst this chorus of criticisms, Bosanquet stands forth

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as the passionate champion of the state. But it is all-important to understand what he means by the state. In a review of Russell's Why Men Fight, he once wrote: "To bring our minds fairly together, we should confess how we respectively approach the thought of the state. I approach it through familiarity with long self-sacrificing lives spent in the service, on behalf of the State, of the children or the poor, or from recollections of the change and opening of the people's minds, within my own experience, from stolidity and resistance to welcome and intelligence in such matters as sanitation. The State, I consider, is then awakening in them." One cannot help wondering what the result would have been if Bosanquet's experience had lain among the routine intrigues of party politics, or in the manœuvres of diplomacy or high finance, or even if it had been the experience of an "Empire-builder" like Cecil Rhodes or a churchman like Cardinal Newman. His theory would not necessarily have been different in principle, yet the emphasis in detail would have been distributed very differently. At any rate, the passage throws a flood of light on the reason why Bosanquet looks on the state as the great moral force in the lives of men; why he calls for "more of the state, not less"; why his ideal of patriotism is one of social service, of citizen spirit and citizen duty. "No patriotism and no politics are trustworthy unless they are kept sweet and clean by a real and fundamental love for the things that are not diminished by being shared—such as kindness, beauty, truth." Devotion to these "eternal values," manifested in a life given up to "the amelioration of the social spirit and social detail here where we live"—that is the essence of a patriotism which makes for peace. "The healthy state, however strong, is non-militant in temper." And health depends on absence of internal friction and injustice. "The royal road to peace is to do right at home, and banish sinister interests and class privileges from the commonwealth." This is a problem of organization, the successful solution of which, making the state more perfect and truer to its own ideal, is possible only if the will of the community is set upon the eternal values. They are not things that men fight about. They make for coöperation, not for competition. They unite men in common aspirations; they bring peace, not war. On this point Russell and Bosanquet are in agreement, though the former uses it to attack the state, the latter to defend it. What either would say, if confronted with Germany's aggressive gospel of a *kulturmission,* with the plea that superior excellence of one's own culture coupled with alleged degeneracy among one's neighbors justifies, not only a defensive, but an offensive war, we can only guess. Religious persecutions likewise show that there are unpleasantly forcible ways of loving one's neighbors. And there is hardly a Christian nation but has spread the blessings of its civilization among lower races with powder and shot. Bosanquet himself quotes the African chief's "First the missionary, then the trader, and then—oh Lord!" The answer, we must suppose, is that men, being what they are, will always make the world unsafe for each other, but that to get the maximum of safety it is more effective to appeal to the best in them than to rely mainly on force.

From this general concept of the state, as not so much a piece of political machinery, but the living spirit of a community in principle identified with a high moral purpose, Bosanquet draws conclusions adverse to the formation of any supernational organization, such as a league of nations for the enforcing of peace. His ideal lies along the lines of the willing coöperation and mutual respect of autonomous nation-states, each developing its own national culture in friendly rivalry with its neighbors, each peaceful in its foreign relations because of the reign of order, justice and peace within its borders. His arguments against leagues and federations, or a world-state, do not appear conclusive, though some are much stronger than others. "Those who think federation necessary for the sake of a central force, obviously believe in force rather than in friendship." This is hardly quite fair to the advocates, e. g., of a league to enforce peace. It is unfortunate that Germany's policy and conduct have tempted even serious thinkers into talking of her as an "outlaw" and "criminal," and proposing the creation of an international "police force." Force alone will not solve the problem, and is sure to fail, in the long run, in preserving peace, unless all first-class nations join the league. But if they join, then that very act presupposes a common purpose, a determination to subordinate and adjust national claims to the general good. Why should not such a common purpose express itself in an organization? Why should not such an organization, like Bosanquet's own ideal state, prepare itself, if need be, to wield force within and without? But "the body which is to be in sole or supreme command of force for the common good must possess a true general will, and for that reason must be a genuine community sharing a common sentiment and animated by a common tradition." Agreed; but the common sentiment is, as we said, presupposed in the formation of the league; the common experience is provided by the war itself. There surely never was a time when all civilized nations have thus bitterly suffered together and at each other's hands.

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However that may be, the real difficulties in the way of Bosanquet's ideal of a society of autonomous nation-states, no less than of a more closely organized league, are not discussed by him. Here is an incidental hint. "It would involve, I assume, universal freedom of trade and intercourse." So it would. Yet think what that means! What a reversal of fiscal policies; what a scrapping of tariffs, of exclusive concessions, of spheres of interest! It means the freedom of the seas, and the abandonment of strategic points of vantage. It means the emancipation of government from capitalist and middle-class control. It means the settlement of the class war by guild-socialism, perhaps, or by syndicalism. It means equal access to markets and raw materials and the cheap labor of the lower races. No doubt, justice and kindness, beauty and truth are the things that matter most, and it is no small service to direct our thoughts once again to them. But how to embody and realize them in the maze and tangle of our actual world, that is a problem apparently too great for any single thinker. Mankind may discover its solution by the trials and errors of generations. But we must expect future wars to be part of the price it will have to pay for the discovery.

R. F. A. H.

Recent Publications

Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education, by H. S. Jennings and others. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.00.

IT was a happy idea of the Chicago Joint Committee on Education to invite four scientists from the fields of biology, psychology, psycho-pathology and sociology, to present their most suggestive ideas concerning the child's development. This little book is of peculiar interest to any one who wants a closer motivation of scientists by the demands and problems of education. One cannot help feeling that this forced attention to these demands on the part of the four lecturers was as truly educational for them as it was for their audience. The biologist, Dr. H. S. Jennings, gives as solid foundation to the modern educator's sense of the "astonishing pains which nature has taken to produce variety of type," and the consequent need of individual attention to children. The biological outlook emphasizes also "the gradual and spontaneous development of the powers," the interdependence of the physical and mental, the necessity of "balanced attention" and for joyous activity in the school.

Dr. John B. Watson comes to the study of children from fifteen years' study of the instinctive reactions in small animals. He limits the emotional life of babies to fear, rage and joy, and is hopeful for a method whereby we can learn to attach emotions in children to appropriate situations, and detach them from situations where they are not useful. He longs for an experimental nursery where he can study this control of instincts and habits in young children.

Dr. Adolf Meyer gives an interesting analysis of the unity of the living body in action with "mind" as the adaptive and creative activity of the biological organism in terms of a biography and record. Dr. William I. Thomas, as sociologist, distinguishes four fundamental types of human interests—those connected with the desire for new experience, with the desire for mastery, with the desire for recognition, with the desire for safety or security. He emphasizes the desire of every human society to remain solidary, and analyzes the means by which the limits are dictated within which the individual desires may find expression. His classification of human types into philistines, bohemians, and creators, closes a most suggestive paper. Mrs. Dummer's course of lectures is as stimulating a contribution to educational theory as it is a gratifying picture of science in action.

Balfour, Viviani and Joffre: Speeches in America and those of the Italian, Belgian and Russian Commissioners during the Great War. Collected and Arranged, with Descriptive Matter, by Francis W. Halsey. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co. $1.50.

MR. HALSEY has not burdened what he pleases to term "descriptive matter" with pointless anecdote or expressive laudatory speeches of introduction. His volume performs the useful historical function of collecting material. Of course it is all the public side of the curtain. The task of correlating these elaborately diplomatic public addresses with the personal biographies of the distinguished men who uttered them, remains for a future historian. Even a hasty reading of the book, however, creates two impressions which one ventures to believe will not later be unjustified by the results of complete investigation. The first is that Mr. Balfour is a master of the shrewd, weighed phrase, a genius at resolving dangerous difficulties and at allaying any nascent suspicions. M. Viviani, on the other hand, is easily the most eloquent orator that we have heard in America for a generation. The close of his speech to the House on May 2 is memorable: "It has been sworn on the tomb of Washington. It has been sworn on the tomb of our allied soldiers, fallen in a sacred cause. It has been sworn by the bedside of our wounded men. It has been sworn on the heads of our orphan children. It has been sworn on cradles and on tombs. It has been sworn!"

Contributors

to this issue

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